GENDER, FAMILY POLICY, AND POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

Andreas Jozwiak: Gender, Family Policy, and Politics
(Under the direction of Pamela Conover & Rahsaan Maxwell)

This dissertation examines the interaction between gender, the welfare state and public opinion in advanced democracies. My first stream of research is driven by an interest and concern for how family policies (re)produce gender and class inequalities, and my goal is to highlight the subtle incentives embedded in family policies that promote more traditional or egalitarian behaviors and attitudes. While some work shows that gender attitudes are becoming more traditional across the post-industrial world, the first chapter shows that this change is more differentiated in ways that are patterned by the particular configuration of family policies in a given time and place. I show that policies that promote women's inclusion in the workforce are associated with egalitarian attitudes towards working mothers, while policies that promote familial care for children and the elderly promotes the diffusion of gender-essentialist beliefs about women.

A second project uses panel data to examine the uneven consequences of a series of German family policy reforms on across educational groups, assessing to what extent these reforms exacerbated or alleviated educational inequalities in women's employment patterns, earnings, and working hours. I show that the German family policy reforms did generate greater inequalities in work-family arrangements across educational groups, such that highly educated families post-reforms and in counties with expanded access to childcare resemble dual-earner families, while the less-educated remain in time and a half or male breadwinner arrangements.

While policies themselves impact behaviors and attitudes, the politics of gender and family policies are contentious. The final chapter of this dissertation examines the relative roles of social sorting and partisan polarization on gender attitudes in the United States, showing how over time the characteristics associated with gender traditionalism/egalitarianism have become more closely tied to the same social and identity groups aligned with the two parties. I show that partisanship does increasingly matter for gender attitudes, but that the effect of partisanship is conditional on sharing the modal social characteristics that are associated with either party.

In memory of Mary Ann Tetreault

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1: IT'S A FAMILY (POLICY) AFFAIR: FAMILY POLICIES AND HETEROGENEITY IN GENDER ATTITUDES

Introduction

Early work on gender attitudes presumed successive generations of individuals would hold more egalitarian gender attitudes as women broke down barriers in the workplace, politics, and at home. As female labor force participation, education, and earnings increased and "women-friendly" family policies diffused across countries, one might expect egalitarian attitudes to emerge, especially among younger cohorts. But instead, scholars of gender attitudes in advanced democracies have found *more* traditional attitudes among younger generations (Charles and Grusky 2004, Cotter et al. 2011, England 2010, Pepin and Cotter 2018, Shorrocks 2018).

Given concern about the "stalled revolution" in support for gender egalitarianism, it is important to understand if changing attitudes represent a resurgence of traditionalism, or, as Knight and Brinton (2017) put it, "varieties of egalitarianism." Individuals can, and often do, hold different attitudes across dimensions of gender attitudes – including combinations of traditional and egalitarian attitudes seemingly at odds with one another (Charles and Grusky 2004, Grunow, et al. 2018, Knight and Brinton 2017, Pepin and Cotter 2018, Scarborough et al. 2019). This literature often focuses on two different types of gender attitudes that are the focus here: support for working mothers (public sphere) and conservative gender essentialist beliefs (private sphere). Support for working mothers assesses beliefs about women's role in the public sphere, specifically about the acceptance of working mothers with young children. Conservative essentialist beliefs are endorsements of traditionally gendered roles and beliefs in "natural" inclinations of women and men.

I argue these "varieties of egalitarianism" are contextually dependent and rely on a nuanced understanding of both family policies and gender attitudes, both which are often measured via a single scale. I suggest that family policies affecting the public and private spheres might constrain and/or shape attitudes on the corresponding dimension of gender attitude. I employ a policy feedback approach (Campbell 2012, Soss and Schram 2007) to understand the relationship between family policies and gender attitudes. A country's family policies differentially constrain a family's decisions about how to best reconcile work and care responsibilities, thereby shaping individuals' material interests. Moreover, they generate norms around expected behaviors even among those not directly affected by these policies (Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017).

Which aspects of family policy regimes generate attitudinal feedback that support different gender attitudes towards the public and private spheres, and vice versa? How to conceptualize the gendered character of family policies has been a subject of debate for several decades; I follow a recent operationalization developed by Lohmann and Zagel (2016). The first are defamilizing policies, or those that aim to reduce the economic and care dependencies women, and especially mothers, generally face. The second set of policies are familizing ones, or those that institutionalize family care responsibilities, potentially also with financial support. Critically, these two sets of policies do not exist on a continuum, and countries frequently combine different policies of across these policy baskets.

Defamilizing policies enable mothers to participate in paid work, while familizing policies actively reinforce women's role in the private sphere. I therefore expect significant correspondence between policies regarding participation in the public/private spheres and attitudes towards women in the public and private spheres, respectively. Attitudes towards working mothers should be sensitive to women's ability to and actual participation in the work sphere. By contrast, gender

essentialist beliefs are tied to the extent to which policies actively *familize* care responsibilities and reinforce the position of mothers as primarily caregivers.

While working mothers have become a reality in most countries, the second half of the gender revolution at home remains a challenge. In particular, while governments have abandoned traditionalist policies, some, including those intended to support women's workforce participation, do not necessarily lead to gender equality in the home. Therefore, I also assess the implications of critiques of defamilization, specifically with regard to men's role in the home and the independent role of women's labor force participation, on attitudes.

I assess this empirically by combining an original dataset of family policies for nineteen advanced democracies from with waves of EVS and ISSP survey data from 1988-2013 on gender attitudes for adults born after 1970. I find defamilization associated with support for working mothers, while familization structures conservative essentialist beliefs. This analysis shows how family policy regimes, in a more fine-grained way than previously understood, shape different sets of gender attitudes. The results suggest that gender attitudes reflect the configuration of family policies and the relative weight these policies place on women's roles in either sphere.

Gender Attitudes: Change and Dimensionality

How gender attitudes fluctuate across time and space is a matter of considerable scholarship. While early research on gender role attitudes found gradual increases in egalitarian attitudes across all societies and generations (see Ferree 1974; Brewster and Padavic 2000; Tallichet and Willits 1986), recent work demonstrates that younger cohorts are sometimes likely to express *more* conservative gender attitudes (Cotter et al. 2011; Charles and Grusky 2004; Pepin and Cotter 2018; Shorrocks 2018). Some of this work argues the culprit is generational socialization (Shorrocks 2018), declines in women's workforce participation and women's earnings (Cotter et al. 2011), cultural conceptions of

femininity, masculinity and mother-/fatherhood (Pepin and Cotter 2018), and changes to the feminist movement itself (Gerson 2010).

How these studies conceptualize and measure gender attitudes is critical for understanding their implications. Some of this work uses unidimensional scales to measure ideologies ranging from traditional to egalitarian, with traditional attitudes underscoring beliefs in essential differences *and* divisions of labor in the home and at work (Ciabattari 2001, Cotter et al. 2011, Inglehart and Norris 2003). Treating gender attitudes as belonging to a single construct – consisting of questions concerning motherhood, suitability for politics, and male primacy – produces more reliable results, but comes at the cost of understanding the complexity of gender ideologies.

By contrast, recent work conceptualizes gender attitudes as differences in kind, in addition to degree, with substantial implications for understanding attitudinal change. This scholarship has revealed that there are many ways in which individuals hold mixes of traditional and egalitarian attitudes across subdimensions (Charles and Grusky 2004, Grunow, et al. 2018, Pepin and Cotter 2018, Scarborough, et al. 2019). While traditional attitudes of the past have waned, they have been replaced by different groupings of gender attitudes, leading Knight and Brinton (2017) to conclude there are several 'types' of egalitarianism in Europe today (see also Grunow et al. 2018, Scarborough et al. 2019).

If the answer to understanding younger individuals' attitudes lies in the heterogeneity of gender attitudes across its subdimensions, which dimensions are particularly important? This literature has, in different contexts, shown there are two important subdimensions of gender attitudes of interest: attitudes towards women in the public and private spheres (England 2010, Gerson 2010, Pepin and Cotter 2018). This distinction has recently been revisited as scholars have found that individuals attach different meanings to work and family spheres (England 2010, Gerson 2010, Pepin and Cotter 2018, Scarborough et al. 2019).

Moreover, there are differing trends on either dimension, reflecting the emergence of "varieties of egalitarianism." The acceptance of women in the public sphere has far outpaced acceptance of changing roles in the private sphere (Mason and Lu 1988). In their work on younger generations' attitudes, several studies report increasing acceptance of women in the workplace (Pepin and Cotter 2018, Shorrocks 2018). At the same time, attitudes towards women in the private sphere (as caregivers) have been resistant to change (Cotter et al. 2011, Crompton and Lyonette 2005, England 2010, Pepin and Cotter 2018). This suggests that despite women's increased labor force participation, gender attitudes are not moving in an egalitarian direction consistent with a unidimensional conceptualization of attitudes. Rather, these sub-dimensions might be differentially shaped by the particular ways in which family policies support different behaviors and norms around gender.

I therefore focus on two questions related to the public/private dimensions for which long-running survey data exists: support for working mothers - are children harmed when mothers work - and conservative essentialism - beliefs that men and women belong in separate spheres and have natural inclinations towards each (Crompton and Lyonette 2005).

Support for Working Mothers

Acceptance of women in the public sphere has developed alongside demand for labor post-World War II, the expansion of the service sector, and family policies that support women's entry into the workforce. Mothers stepping into the labor force in critical numbers influenced the socialization experience for young children, seeding new gender norms (England 2010, Sutfin et al. 2008, Yu and Lee 2013). Similarly, fathers' increased involvement in childcare and housework signals the end of rigid separation of gendered roles, likely reducing perceptions parents cannot be caregivers and breadwinners. Finally, beliefs in an inherent conflict between mothers' roles conflicts

with contemporary conceptions of autonomy, "choice," and (neo-)liberalism (Percheski 2008, Yu and Lee 2013).

Traditional Essentialist Beliefs

Questions about gender essentialism measure attitudes towards the private sphere, concerning the normatively "proper" roles for men and women and including questions about inherent desires or traits. These questions therefore also tap into conceptions of masculinity and fatherhood. Changes in this realm are more contested, as scholars suggest the gender revolution in the home is more difficult to achieve, even as barriers for women in the workplace have been broken down (England 2010, Goldscheider et al. 2015, Yu and Lee 2013). While men's involvement in the household has increased over time, Hook (2010) shows that men's uptake of typically-gendered housework has slowed in the recent past and remains lower than women's, leading to a "double burden" (Collins 2019, Hochschild and Machung 1989).

Essentialism has also been made compatible with feminist discourses and culture. (Neo-)liberal ideologies have become intertwined with gender egalitarianism in ways that perpetuate essentialist beliefs. Especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, (neo-) liberalism is integrated with the rhetoric of 'choice' to frame persistent gender inequalities as merely the result of an aggregation of women's preferences and valuation of different goals in life (Bjarnason and Hjamsdottir 2008, Crompton and Lyonette 2005). While formally neutral, this views gender inequalities, divisions of unpaid labor, and segregated gender roles ultimately as individual "choices," effectively depoliticizing and downplaying the relevance of gender (Ferugson 2010).

Essentialist attitudes therefore may or may not coincide with support for working mothers. In fact, research has documented diverging trends in these dimensions of attitudes and the emergence of different combinations of attitudes across countries (Cotter et al. 2011, Grunow et al. 2018, Knight and Brinton 2017, Yu & Lee 2013). The configuration of family policies in a given

time and place should illuminate when and where different groupings – or "varieties" – of attitudes might emerge.

The Role of Context

Previous work has suggested some associations between gender ideologies and family policies. However, this research has frequently been limited over time and space (Grunow et al., Sjöberg 2004, Lomazzi et al. 2018), measures of family policies (Lomazzi et al. 2018), or conceptualization of gender attitudes (Sjöberg 2004, Lomazzi et al. 2018). To what extent combinations of the two dimensions - support for working mothers and essentialist beliefs - correspond to work-family policies across countries over time remains an important question.

What form this correspondence between policy and attitudes takes remains a matter of debate. According to one perspective, gender ideologies played an instrumental role in the development of work-family policies (Lewis et al. 2008, see also Pfau-Effinger 2004). Alternatively, the literature on the politics of family policies emphasizes the role of labor market needs, demographic stresses, and political competition in driving the development of policies, especially in cases of dramatic reforms (Morgan 2013). In many cases, gender ideologies were far more traditional than the progressive policies politicians enacted. Some have employed rigorous causal identification to examine the effects of family policy reform on women's work (Ziefle and Gangl 2014, Zoch and Hondralis 2017), work commitment (Gangl and Ziefle 2015), and father's involvement in housework and childcare (Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011). Zoch and Schober (2018) show in turn that expanded childcare led to more egalitarian gender attitudes in Germany, while Wrohlich and Unterhofer (2017) find similar effects on individuals indirectly affected by policies. It should also be noted that other important "pull" factors also shape these same outcomes.

Given these complexities, I cannot claim to find narrowly identified causal effects in a single direction from work-family policies to attitudes. Because the central question is how different

dimensions of family policies associated with different types of gender attitudes around the postindustrial world, whether policy structures attitudes or the other way around is, for this study, relatively less important. Nevertheless, I employ a policy feedback approach to understand this relationship. This approach understands policy changes and legacies as events which restructure future politics in a cyclical manner. The literature on comparative social policy focuses on two mechanisms affecting attitudes: changes in opportunity structures (material interests) and norms (psychological adaptations) (Gangl and Ziefle 2015). Completing the cycle, these orientations and attitudes in the form of cultural frames become drivers of the policymaking process themselves.

Changes in attitudes follow the two mechanisms outlined by the social policy literature, which may operate on different timelines. New institutional arrangements create new material interests for those most affected by the policies while policy change alters the costs and opportunities of different work-life arrangements. Changes might occur relatively quickly as parents benefit from the new scheme. Importantly, how social policies are experienced and perceived may differ from their intended effects (see Stadelmann-Steffen and Oehrli 2017). How policies change norms around parenthood is likely a slower process, though there is some evidence of rapid adaptation (Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017). This work suggests that analyzing attitudinal responsiveness to family policies should take into account complex temporal processes.

How, and when, should family policies shape gender attitudes? Without significant policy changes, we can expect substantial congruence between policies and attitudes. When policy change occurs, there is likely a period of incongruence or even backlash if the issue is highly politicized (see Naumann 2014), followed by change as material interests are transformed. Second, a broader alignment of attitudes with new institutional arrangements occurs over long periods of time due to cohort replacement. The scope of this article means I am only able to capture a snapshot of the congruence between attitudes and behavior.

I contend the case of family policies and gender attitudes may be different. First, gender attitudes vary due to both life cycle and cohort replacement effects (Brewster and Padavic 2000). Second, family policies are both highly visible and proximate – a key assumption undergirding the relationship between attitudes and policies (Soss and Schram 2007). But family policies are unique in that they are proximate *especially* for younger individuals whose lived experiences of parenthood or prospects of parenthood are directly affected by policy. Dramatic changes in family policies, which have occurred in many post-industrial democracies, set different parameters around how parents negotiate work and care. While full-scale attitudinal change may take decades, I assess the correspondence between attitudes and policies in the short time after policies transform the experience of parenthood.

Family Policies: Defamilization and Familization

The remaining question is which elements of family policy promote egalitarian or traditional attitudes on the two dimensions of gender attitudes examined here. Family policies are heterogenous, including childcare, working time accommodations, maternity and parental leave, and the financial position of families with children, all of which form the critical context in which individuals make decisions and form opinions about how to organize care and work responsibilities.

Conceptualization and Measurement of Family Policies

Scholars have long pointed out the differing consequences of welfare state policies on gender inequalities in the home and society. The original critiques of welfare state theories were that they ignored women's positions while at the same time took for granted mothers' unpaid labor in the home (Lewis 1992, Orloff 1993). A resulting rich literature has developed that centers women's role in welfare state policies, integrating it to analyses of welfare provision through the market, state, and family. Within this state-market-family triangle, care responsibilities can be distributed in

different ways: states can support the extension of public childcare facilities, reinforce social responsibilities between family members, or rely on market provision (Esping-Andersen 1999, Leitner 2003). Where and how policies place care burdens are critical to understanding their relationship to attitudes.

The concept of defamilization, with an opposing pole of familization, arose as scholars sought to understand women's positions in different welfare states. While there are competing definitions, the concept seeks to assess the extent to which individuals can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of the family ("individualization," Lister 1994) or women's ability to form and maintain households of their own without a male head (Orloff 1993). Defamilization encompasses two sub-components: women's economic independence and the removal of intergenerational care dependencies (Lister 1994, McLaughlin and Glendinning 1994, Orloff 1993, Saraceno 1994). Defamilization's roots are in the concept of de-commodification, implying there is an element of 'commodification' of mothers that has to occur before (mostly) women can be unburdened through state or market interventions. Defamilization therefore relates to women's participation in the public sphere, specifically on the labor market.

The extent of (de)familization depends on how policies shape gender and family relations. The most important policy distinction is whether spending on family benefits funds services or subsidies directly to families (Leitner 2003, Saraceno and Keck 2010, Korpi 2000). State provision of childcare has an unambiguously defamilizing effect because it relieves mothers of care burdens and allows them to participate in the workforce, often in an expanded public sector. Market provision of childcare could theoretically be considered defamilizing, but is class-biased; a families' ability to purchase childcare and the quality of childcare varies greatly with income. Parental leave can have a defamilizing effect, but this depends on its structure. Shorter, job-protected leaves at higher pay encourage mothers to return to the workforce and reduce the skill attrition associated with longer

leaves. Defamilizing policies, then, are "pull" factors related to women's workforce participation. Women in countries with extensive policy support should be more likely to participate in the workforce, even with young children (Huber et al. 2009, Nelson and Stephens 2013).

Familizing policies explicitly maintain and reinforce dependencies among family members by promoting family care for children and the elderly. These policies lower the social and economic consequences for women who step out of the labor force (Leitner 2003, Saraceno and Keck 2010). They 'familize' by making acceptable and legal arrangements where mothers remain primary caregivers. The primary policy instruments include: cash transfers and tax benefits for children, pension credits for care, and long-term, low-paid leaves. Long leave entitlements encourage women to step out of the labor force for long periods, making reentry less probable (Morgan and Zippel 2003). Direct and indirect transfers, in the form of cash benefits and tax credits and deductions, familize care responsibilities by enabling and subsidizing (mostly) women's role as primary caregivers (Jaumotte 2003). These policies constitute significant deterrents to workforce participation; mothers in countries with higher levels of familization tend to work part time, earn lower shares of household income, and perform more housework (Alper 2019, Hook 2015, Kleider 2015).

Because family policy covers a range of policy instruments and states can – and often do – combine defamilizing and familizing policies, the extent of defamilization/familization does not lie on a single continuum (Leitner 2003, Lohmann and Zagel 2016, Saraceno and Keck 2010). What are the implications of this framework for gender equality? These different combinations of family policies – especially because they tend to be patterned by variations in political configurations – constitute different "varieties" of family policies and gender relations. Defamilizing policies were often developed in response to concerns over welfare state sustainability and fertility, and women's (lack of) participation in paid work. As a result, they have been a means to encourage women's labor force participation and facilitate 'reconciliation' of work and care, while promoting gender equality

has been a secondary goal (Lewis and Giullari 2005, see also Blum 2014, Morel 2007, Morgan 2013). In her critique of emergent "adult-worker models," Daly (2011) argues that the evolution of policies points towards a dual-earner, but gender-specialized family arrangement (see also Fraser 1994). While defamilizing policies resolve labor force attachment and childcare concerns for women, they neglect to meaningfully address gender inequality in the home, leaving men's roles untouched (Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014, Ciccia and Verloo 2012, Lewis and Giullari 2005). While having working mothers might lead to more equitable distributions of housework, working mothers are still are expected to be primary caregivers and perform the bulk of unpaid household labor (Hochschild and Machung 1989).

Because the social rights of women (and men) as workers are more strongly institutionalized than parent's rights to care for their children or a child's right to care (Leira 1998), the concept of (de)familization is perhaps a poor metric against which to judge policies that encourage men's participation in housework and childcare. For the most part, parental leaves are overwhelmingly taken by women. Only a small number of (highly educated) fathers take any leave that is a family entitlement, especially when they are poorly paid (Leave Network Report 2019). Similarly, public childcare allows and encourages women to work without necessarily encouraging men's involvement. Defamilization, then, undervalues family care and parent's right to care time (Knijn and Kremer 1997). If care by both parents were equally valued, as suggested by Fraser's (1994) universal caregiver model, these policies could also be considered familizing, but with altogether different consequences for gender equality.

One way to address this gap is by interrogating policies that actively seek to reshape care responsibilities. Ciccia and Verloo (2012) introduce several measures that better measure the consequences of leave policies for gender equality in the home (see Table 1). These policies are slightly beyond the concept of defamilization, as they affirm care rights and support gender equality

in the home. One key policy instrument is "use it or lose it" fathers' month, which might induce fathers to take leave, which has led to greater involvement in childcare, housework, and changing social norms of fatherhood (Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011, Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017). This is especially true where these leaves are well paid, and these policies are at their most effective when they can be taken flexibly and non-simultaneously with a mothers' leave (Ciccia and Verloo 2012).

Finally, women's labor force participation is not itself a 'policy,' strictly speaking, but high levels of women's labor force participation are a consequence of gender-neutral family policy regimes. High levels of female labor force participation may also reflect 'push' factors beyond the scope of family policies, such as economic necessity.

Expectations

The literature suggests a multi-dimensional conceptualization of gender attitudes and family policies should be a starting point for research on the relationship between family policies and gender attitudes. I focus on two dimensions outlined in the gender attitudes literature that are of substantive interest: attitudes towards working mothers and essentialist beliefs. In the previous section, I outlined two sets of family policies with differing consequences for women in the public and private spheres. A policy feedback approach suggests family policies shape gender attitudes through opportunity structure and norm-setting mechanisms, meaning that we should expect to see congruence between the two as policies are enacted and mature. The specific ways in which the gendered features of the welfare state interact should shed light on different varieties of egalitarianism, present across the world today.

Defamilizing policies enable women to participate in paid work through alleviating care burdens, especially for mothers with younger children. On average shorter but better remunerated leaves encourage women's return to the workforce after childbirth. This, combined with high-quality and subsidized childcare, means women no longer have to provide care themselves or find family

members to provide informal childcare, allowing them to participate in fully paid work. Independent of the presence of defamilizing policies, high levels of women's workforce participation similarly support acceptance of mothers as workers, as this alters households and socialization environments for children and perpetuate norms around working mothers (Bolzendahl and Meyers 2004; Ciabattari 2001; Fan and Marini 2000, Sutfin et al. 2008). Policy defamilization and women's labor force participation are therefore closely related to one of the attitudinal dimensions examined here: support for working mothers.

Familizing policies promote women's role as a primary caregivers and confinement to the private sphere through cash for care schemes, low and poorly paid leaves, and tax benefits for single earner couples. By reinforcing and actively supporting traditionally gendered roles, these policies map onto (endorsements of) essentialist beliefs. Women's labor force participation may also support and reflect essentialist attitudes, especially where market activating pressures push mothers into the labor force and produce stark inequalities in access to childcare and leave. Mothers in these situations report facing the greatest pressures to be a 'supermom' and devote significant effort to both care and career (Collins 2019). This pressuring of work without support might make apparent certain benefits of or nostalgia for traditional arrangements (England 2010).

But gender equality in the private sphere, and specifically men's involvement in it, sits uncomfortably within the concepts of (de)familization. These critiques argue that policies transforming gender roles should lure non-carers into care through use it or lose it "daddy" months with generous compensation to offset potential losses of family income. I expect measures of leave policies specifically intended to transform gender roles to be associated with egalitarian gender attitudes on attitudinal dimensions.

Data

I have created a new dataset containing annual measures of family policies for nineteen advanced democracies from 1980 to the present. The countries include nineteen advanced democracies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I collected data on the measures found in Table 1 to create the defamilization and familization indices from Lohmann and Zagel (2016) and Ciccia and Verloo's (2012) measures. All of these measures were originally only created for a single year, so putting them to the empirical test over time serves an important purpose in validating them. Though these are complex concepts, their measurement here is reduced to two dimensions for simplicity. While there are other datasets of leave and childcare policies - for example, SPIN, Multilinks, and Gauthier (2011) – they do not contain enough measures or coverage over time and space to analyze their effect on gender attitudes. The SPIN data is only measured once every five years, and lacks some of the measures capturing the gendered nature of the welfare state. Multilinks, despite having most of the desired measures, only covers 2004 and has some incomplete data for 2009. Gauthier's data was foundational, but lacks several indicators and coverage over time.

Table 1 lists the individual measures that are used to create the defamilization/familization indices and Ciccia and Verloo's (2012) measures. I collected data from a variety of sources; details on data collection of each measure shown in Table 1 can be found in the Appendix in Table A1. The indicators making up the defamilization and familization indices are first standardized between 0 and 1 (by year) and then summed in an index, following Lohmann and Zagel's (2016) approach. Figure 1 shows the scores for familization and defamilization for all countries in the sample in 2010.

Table 1: Family Policy Measures

Family Policy Measures, 1980-present	
Defamilizing Policies	Individual Entitlement to Childcare for Children < 3 (Yes/No)
	Enrollment in Formal Childcare (3-5 year olds)
	Public Spending on Daycare (% GDP)
	Duration of Well-Paid Leave (Months)
	Duration of Paternity Leave (Days)
Familizing Policies	Universal Child Allowances (Yes/No)
	Tax Deduction or Credit for Children (Yes/No)
	Child Allowance for 1 Child (share net avg. wages)
	Child Allowance for 3 Children (share net avg. wages)
	Tax Benefits to Families (share net avg. wages)
	Duration of Unpaid, Job-Protected Leave
Gender Equality Index	Reliance on Family Care (total leave time)
	Monetary Value of Family Care (FTE leave/total leave time ratio)
	Concentration of care work (gender concentration of leave)
	Fatherhood Opportunity Index

Note: Measures of Defamilizing and Familizing Policies adapted from Lohmann and Zagel (2016) to allow for measures across years. Gender Equality Index adapted from Ciccia and Verloo (2012). Data from multiple sources (see Appendix).

I also replicate Ciccia and Verloo's (2012) measures of family policy. The first, reliance on family care, measures the total extent of parental leave time – regardless of remuneration. The monetary value of care calculates the equivalent leave that is available at full pay divided by the total leave time available. The concentration of care work measures parents' relative entitlements to care, calculated as the ratio of mothers' to fathers' full-time equivalent entitlements. When this measure equals 1, both parents have a right to equal leave durations, while a zero means only a mother has leave entitlements. Shared leave is not counted in this index because shared leave is almost entirely taken by women. The final measure, the fatherhood index, measures the type, length, and pay of paternity leaves.

Figure 1: Family Policies in 2010



Note: Data from author's calculations and multiple sources. See Table 1 for scale construction. The greyed terms refer to Leitner's (2003) and Saraceno and Keck (2010) typologies of family policies.

Public opinion data on gender attitudes come from combining all waves of the EVS/WVS and ISSP "Family and Changing Gender Roles" modules. This gives me more continuous coverage of gender attitudes from 1988 to 2013. My dependent variables measure two distinct sets of gender

attitudes: support for working mothers and conservative essentialist beliefs. I focus on two measures with the largest coverage across both ISSP and WVS/EVS in order to expand the statistical power of the models. Disagreement with "A child suffers when the mother works when a child is young," measures support for working mothers, while agreement with "Being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay," measures essentialist beliefs. Variables are recoded such that higher values indicate more egalitarian/non-traditional responses. In the Appendix (Table A4) I model the relationships with three alternative dependent variables.

The final dataset is of gender attitudes and family policies for 19 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the U.S) for surveys taken between 1988 and 2013. I exclude East Germany because of Germany's internally heterogeneous policies. I exclusively look at younger individuals born after 1970, capturing people of the same cohort at different ages and narrowly addressing the question about the resurgence of conservative gender attitudes among younger generations.

Methods

This analysis employs a combination of country-year level contextual and survey data in multi-level models. This modelling technique accounts for variation within various nested groups, in this case individuals nested in countries nested in years. Whereas standard OLS-regression models assume independence among units, the assumption undergirding multi-level models is that the interdependence within units is stronger than that between units (i.e. people in the same country are more similar to one another than those in other countries, or that countries are more similar to themselves in consecutive years than they are to other countries). A random intercept model is used such that country-year level indicators have different intercepts but the same slope.

A concern with multi-level models is whether or not bias and error occurs when estimating

hierarchical models with relatively few upper level clusters – in this case – countries and years. Elff et al. (2019) find that the actual parameter (coefficient) estimates do not suffer from bias, but caution that the test statistic (used to determine statistical significance) can err. They recommend using an REML (between-within) estimator with an adjusted test statistic of a *t* distribution with df = clusters – predictors – 1 to account for a relatively small number of clusters. This results in highly conservative estimates and penalizes the inclusion of additional country-level variables. Importantly, it leaves unchanged the test statistic for individual level variables, such that the degrees of freedom for individual level variables remains equal to the sample size minus the number of micro level predictors.

Analysis was done using the nlme package in R, which uses a between-within estimator Elff et al. (2019) suggest. Time is modelled as a quadratic following Carter and Signorino (2010), allowing me to account for temporal interdependence. Survey weights are used rescaled with the parameters package in R such that they can be used with the nlme package. I include the following set of individual level controls: age, sex, education (ISCED), religious attendance, religion, marital status, number of children, and employment status. At the country level, I introduce my measures of defamilization and familization to the model. I add measures for female labor force participation and welfare state generosity as political economy variables.

A policy feedback approach suggests there may be different time horizons at which attitudes align with family policies. The implementation of reforms takes time. Initially, incongruence is to be expected: there may be backlash and individuals have not yet experienced the effect of new policies. As time passes, I expect greater alignment of attitudes and family policies, not the least because for younger individuals, family policies set different parameters and expectations around early parenthood. Therefore, I lag family policies of five years ago to the survey data, and in the Appendix (Table 1.6) replicate these models with different lag structures.

Results

Table 2: Multi Level Models of Support for Working Mothers

	Dependent Variable	
	Working Mothers	
	(1)	(2)
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Sex	0.229*** (0.018)	0.223*** (0.018)
Religious Attendance (Never)	0.044*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.005)
Education	0.101*** (0.007)	0.100*** (0.007)
Children	-0.040*** (0.011)	-0.039*** (0.010)
L-R Placement	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.032*** (0.004)
Employed	0.092*** (0.021)	0.106*** (0.020)
Religion (ref: Secular)		
Catholic	-0.043 (0.028)	-0.040 (0.027)
Orthodox	-0.189** (0.085)	-0.198** (0.082)
Protestant	0.019 (0.029)	0.010 (0.028)
Muslim	-0.719*** (0.067)	-0.708*** (0.066)
Other	-0.288*** (0058)	-0.303*** (0.056)
Marital Status (ref: Married)		
Cohabitating	-0.020 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.043)
Divorced	0.052 (0.061)	0.016 (0.056)
Separated	0.004 (0.072)	-0.019 (0.069)
Widowed	0.012 (.231)	-0.045 (0.207)
Single	0.010 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.025)
Country Level Variables		
Defamilization	0.266*** (0.071)	0.296*** (0.077)
Familization	-0.060 (0.066)	-0.052 (0.067)
Female LF Participation	0.012 (0.008)	0.013* (0.008)
Welfare State Generosity		-0.014 (0.011)
Time	0.028 (0.138)	-0.082 (0.070)
$Time^2$	-0.001 (0.009)	0.006 (0.005)
$Time^3$	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	1.859** (0.805)	2.724*** (0.599)
Observations	17098	15822
Akaike Inf. Crit.	49455.24	52937.17
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	49662.53	53154.04

Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Table 2 shows the results from the models assessing attitudes towards the consequences of working mothers. In each case, the individual level variables behave predictably, and because the interest is on contextual effects, I will focus on the differences among country level variables. As expected, defamilization, or the extent to which policies support mother's ability to reconcile work and family, is statistically and substantively significantly related to more egalitarian attitudes towards working mothers. A one-point increase in defamilization, roughly a one standard deviation change in defamilization, is associated with about 6% increase in egalitarian attitudes, which amounts to a 22% across the full scale of defamilization.

In Model 2, I include welfare state generosity, to control for welfare state effort, especially to assess the impact in places where welfare states do very little. Except for defamilization, neither of the other country level variables are significant. Familization, which incentivizes traditionally gendered behaviors and stay at home parenting, has a negative sign, but is far from statistical significance. Female labor force participation does cross the $p < 0.10$ threshold, suggesting higher levels of female labor force participation are associated with more egalitarian attitudes. When the models are separately run by sex (see Appendix Table 1.5), the effect of a country's female labor force participation has a significant effect at the 0.05 level, but only for women. The positive sign for female labor force participation is in line with an argument that policies aside, there is an independent effect of labor force participation, which through changes in norms and behaviors is associated with support for working mothers.

Substantively, this suggests the gender attitude dimension of support for women in public spheres like work, even in the presence of small children, is strongly related to contexts in which women a) are more likely to work and b) where that work is supported by policies that, by design, are intended to increase women's economic independence through shorter, well paid leaves and by alleviating care duties through childcare provision. The highest levels of support for working

mothers, then, would be found in contexts with significant policy development on the defamilization dimension *and* high levels of workforce participation (for example, Scandinavia). The lowest levels, by contrast, are found in places with low levels of defamilization *and* low levels of labor force participation, for example those in Southern Europe.

Table 3: Multi Level Models of Essentialist Beliefs

	Dependent Variable	
	Essentialism	
	(1)	(2)
Age	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Sex	0.160*** (0.018)	0.160*** (0.019)
Religious Attendance (Never)	0.051*** (0.005)	0.052*** (0.005)
Education	0.053*** (0.006)	0.052*** (0.007)
Children	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.020* (0.011)
L-R Placement	-0.026*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.005)
Employed	0.130*** (0.020)	0.135*** (0.021)
Religion (ref: Secular)		
Catholic	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.028)
Orthodox	-0.022 (0.085)	-0.074 (0.088)
Protestant	0.012 (0.028)	0.014 (0.029)
Muslim	-0.103 (0.065)	-0.094 (0.067)
Other	0.011 (0.053)	-0.009 (0.055)
Marital Status (ref: Married)		
Cohabitating	0.046 (0.036)	0.058 (0.038)
Divorced	0.074 (0.058)	0.068 (0.063)
Separated	0.230*** (0.066)	0.263*** (0.070)
Widowed	-0.086 (0.222)	-0.056 (0.241)
Single	0.143*** (0.025)	0.157*** (0.026)
Country Level Variables		
Defamilization	0.084 (0.070)	0.032 (0.070)
Familization	-0.131** (0.058)	-0.147** (0.059)
Female LF Participation	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.006)
Welfare State Generosity		0.024** (0.010)
Time	-0.014 (0.066)	-0.155 (0.128)
$Time^2$	-0.00 (0.005)	0.008 (0.008)
$Time^3$	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	4.062*** (0.498)	4.284*** (0.766)
Observations	21336	19521

Akaike Inf. Crit.	70370.92	64370.07
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	70586.03	64590.65

Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Table 3 assesses the impact of family policies on conservative essentialism. Here, the results suggest that defamilization, or support for two-earner couples, is positively signed, but not significantly related to essentialist beliefs. However, the extent to which family policies explicitly support traditional households via long (un)paid leaves and child allowances for mothers is significantly related to traditional (essentialist) beliefs. A one unit shift in familization is associated with 3 percent change in essentialist beliefs (about 11 percent moving over the full range of familization). This provides evidence for the idea that policies supporting traditional families and gendered arrangements is associated with more traditional visions of women's roles in society. Moreover, it suggests conservative essentialist beliefs are most strongly driven by the extent of policies' support for traditional families irrespective of how much policies support working mothers.

Several of the country level controls are significant in these models. In line with expectations, female labor force participation here has a negative sign and is significant, suggesting that after controlling for family policies, countries and years with high levels of female labor force participation are associated with more traditional beliefs about men's and women's places in society.

These findings for the additional country controls are in keeping with findings from the previous section that showed familism by default, or countries with a lack of support for families with children overall, is associated in recent years with more conservative beliefs. While it is not possible to parse this out here, it may point to a backlash against situations where it is extremely difficult, especially for lower-resource families, to balance work and care responsibilities. The tension between work and care may make apparent the benefits of or generate nostalgia for traditional arrangements. These findings speak to the 'egalitarian essentialist' frames found most by others in

Anglo-Saxon countries like Australia and the United States (Cotter et al. 2011, Pepin and Cotter 2018). In those contexts, but not exclusively, egalitarian essentialism is most tied to neoliberal discourses of 'choice' and personal responsibility for childcare, which is seen as an exclusively private matter (Bjarnason and Hjalmsdottir 2008, Crompton and Lyonette 2005).

Finally, I also hypothesized that taking critiques of defamilization and its operationalization seriously means examining policies that promote gender equality in the home and between partners. Specifically, these critiques argue that defamilization merely allows for women to work and have children (addressing fertility and welfare state sustainability concerns), promoting dual-earning without promoting dual-caring. But some countries have adopted 'fathers' quotas' that, in some cases, mean fathers cannot take leave simultaneously as mothers, meaning they assume full time care duties. It is therefore important to understand if these (recent) changes to family policies to encourage men to act as carers have an impact on attitudes. While there is some evidence in particular countries (i.e. Norway, see Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011), it is worth investigating in a broader manner. To do this, I turn to the additional measures provided by Ciccia and Verloo (2012) from Table 1 to assess what additional impact, if any, the more nuanced gendered measures of family policies might have on attitudes.

In each case, the additional measures of gender equality from Ciccia and Verloo (2012) do not yield much additional predictive power (Appendix Table 1.6). For working mothers, the fatherhood index is significant, rendering the defamilization index insignificant. However, this variable is correlated with the defamilization index at 0.81, indicating a strong possibility of multicollinearity. For essentialist beliefs, higher valuation of care (i.e. where pay for care approaches 100% of wages for the full duration of leave) is associated with more traditional attitudes. The lack of general support for this hypothesis is possible for several reasons. First, it is possible that many of the more recently enacted measures of family policies are simply too new to have an effect on

individuals' attitudes, and that the large number of instances in which the variables are equal to zero (for example, where only mothers have access to leave entitlements or where fathers have no right to parental leave) for many countries and years skews results. However, as these policies mature, in particular the expansion of 'father's quotas,' daycare, and policies like Sweden's 'gender equality bonus' intended to incentivize mothers' return to work, we might expect them to have a greater effect on gender attitudes that has been documented in qualitative work.

Discussion

This work sheds new light on an important question: how should we interpret findings that younger generations of individuals hold mixes of egalitarian and traditional gender attitudes? I argue part of the answer lies in understanding the heterogeneity of gender attitudes, and the corresponding elements of family policies that support certain beliefs. By operationalizing different dimensions of gender attitudes and family policies, I show how unidimensional measures of both family policies and gender attitudes might lead to erroneous conclusions about the relationship between the two. The resulting configuration of gender attitudes reflects the constraints of family policies on both work and home spheres. In doing so, I show Knight and Brinton's (2017) "varieties of egalitarianism" in advanced postindustrial democracies are linked to specific institutional contexts.

These results show that there is congruence (with important nuance) between attitudes and family policies. In the short term, gender attitudes seem to be shaped by policies among the population analyzed here – young people of parenting age who are directly affected by family policies. In the long term, policy feedback scholars suggest more sweeping attitudinal alignment may occur only with cohort replacement, implying these findings represent a lower bound of policies' effects.

I show that defamilization and familization are exclusively related to specific elements of individuals' gender ideologies. Specifically, countries with defamilized social policy regimes that

provide high levels of support for dual earner families promote increasingly egalitarian beliefs towards working mothers among generations born after 1970. These policies were intended to address women's care and financial independence, and where these policies are developed and barriers to women's full participation in the labor market addressed, more egalitarian attitudes emerge. These results also shed light on the limits of policies intended to improve women's economic position through workforce participation, as these policies are not associated with more egalitarian beliefs on the essentialist dimension, potentially because these policies do not consistently seek to reshape care arrangements.

By contrast, familist policies are closely associated with endorsements of essentialist beliefs. While previous work has found evidence of essentialist attitudes in Anglo-Saxon welfare states where the rhetoric of "choice" is more prevalent and women face the greatest work-family pressures, I show that these beliefs are more widespread.

While the concept of (de)familization is complex, here it has been measured via two dimensions, which unfortunately limits my ability to fully capture their causes and consequences. For example, while in some cases the goal of family policy reforms was to encourage gender equality in the home and market (Herenes 1987), in others it was to draw women into the labor force (Morgan 2013), while in others, like France, policy was explicitly natalist (Morel 2007). Defamilization's impact on gender equality, then, largely depends the benchmarks used to measure gender equality.

A generation of scholarship viewed women's incorporation into the labor force as a path to equality, as their earnings translated into economic and bargaining power in society and at home. These results paint a more complicated picture of the relationship between labor force inclusion and gender attitudes. Female labor force participation does promote egalitarian beliefs about working mothers, partially corroborating this hypothesis. However, female labor force participation is also associated with a greater likelihood of endorsing gender essentialist beliefs. This is striking, and

demonstrates that while women can and have broken barriers in the workplace, it has come along with sustained beliefs of mothers as homemakers and caregivers. One potential culprit is that female labor force participation and the policies supporting it developed much further than egalitarian care policies. As a result, working mothers became a reality much sooner than care policies actively sought to reshape care dependencies in the family, resulting in a double burden.

The configurations of gender attitudes, or varieties of egalitarianism, are linked to different combinations of familization and defamilization, which in turn are connected to broader patterns of welfare states and welfare state politics (Esping-Andersen 1999, Huber and Stephens 2001). Unique "varieties" of gender attitudes have emerged in advanced democracies, representing complex movements away from traditionalism that are not to be mistaken with backlash. These are likely stable outcomes, reflecting both historical trajectories and recent transformations of family policies.

Specifically, combinations of high support for working mothers exist alongside lower endorsements of essentialism in Scandinavian countries with high levels of defamilization and low levels of familization. These countries with legacies of defamilizing policies have more egalitarian attitudes, which provides an important baseline for future policy changes. By contrast, and despite the fact that Continental (familist) regimes experienced low fertility, welfare state sustainability issues, and pressures to boost women's labor force participation, these countries have done so in ways consistent with their historical trajectories. Heterogeneous mixes of both sets of gender attitudes can be expected to prevail where recent reforms have 'layered on' defamilizing policies while leaving intact many familizing ones. One might expect egalitarian attitudes might emerge, but only on the working mothers dimension; there is lingering traditionalism in essentialist beliefs. Taken together, this work suggests that rather than understanding contemporary changes in attitudes in terms of backlash, changes should be understood to be contextually dependent movements away

from traditional attitudes. The gender revolution is incomplete, but this work suggests different challenges exist across countries and that these challenges are linked to work-family policies.

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APPENDIX

Both the defamilization and familization indices borrow from, but ultimately modify, the measures developed by Lohmann and Zagel (2016). Historical data on several of their measures, particularly for elder care, are less readily available over time, and are thus excluded from this measure. While familization and defamilization is linked to intergenerational dependencies beyond the parent – child one, I only am able to focus on parent-child policy measures here. Lohmann and Zagel's original index included enrollment information for 0-2 year-olds, but this is unavailable before 2000. I substitute daycare spending as a % GDP in my calculation of defamilization. I also include tax benefits to families (as % APW net wages) in the measure of familization.

Data for additional years were collected from a wide range of sources:

Table 1.4: Family Policy Indicators

Family Policy Indicators, 1980-present		
Defamilizing Policies	Individual Entitlement to Childcare for Children < 3 (Yes/No)	SEEPRO-R
	Enrollment in Formal Childcare (3-5 year olds)	OECD, World Bank
	Public Spending on Daycare (% GDP)	Comparative Welfare States Dataset
	Duration of Well-Paid Leave (Months)	Gauthier, OECD, Multilinks, SSPTW, Leave Network Annual Reports
	Duration of Paternity Leave (Days)	Multilinks, OECD, SSPTW, Leave Network Annual Reports
Familizing Policies	Universal Child Allowances (Yes/No)	Multilinks, SSPTW, MISSOC, SPIN

	Tax Deduction or Credit for Children (Yes/No)	Multilinks, SSPTW, MISSOC, SPIN
	Child Allowance for 1 Child (share net avg. wages)	Multilinks, SSPTW, MISSOC, SPIN
	Child Allowance for 3 Children (share net avg. wages)	Multilinks, SSPTW, MISSOC, SPIN
	Tax Benefits to Families (share net avg. wages)	Gauthier, OECD
	Duration of Unpaid, Job-Protected Leave	Multilinks, OECD, Leave Network Annual Reports
	Marginal Tax Rate for Second Earners*	Jaumotte (2003), OECD
Gender Equality Index	Reliance on Family Care (total leave time)	Multilinks, Gauthier, OECD, Leave Network Annual Reports
	Monetary Value of Family Care (FTE leave/total leave time ratio)	Multilinks, Gauthier, OECD, Leave Network Annual Reports
	Concentration of care work (gender concentration of leave)	Multilinks, Gauthier, OECD, Leave Network Annual Reports
	Fatherhood Opportunity Index	Multilinks, Gauthier, OECD, Leave Network Annual Reports

Note: Measures of Defamilizing and Familizing Policies adapted from Lohmann and Zagel (2016) to allow for measures across years. Gender Equality Index adapted from Ciccia and Verloo (2012). Data from multiple sources (see Appendix). *Only available as of 2000 and not included in composite indices.

Table 1.5: Multi Level Models by Sex

	Dependent Variable			
	Men		Women	
	Working Mothers	Essentialism	Working Mothers	Essentialism
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Religious Attendance (Never)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.048*** (0.007)	0.047*** (0.007)	0.056*** (0.007)
Education	0.098*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.108*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.009)
Children	-0.055*** (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.028* (0.015)
L-R Placement	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.018*** (0.006)
Employed	0.003 (0.033)	0.029 (0.032)	0.150*** (0.027)	0.194*** (0.027)
Religion (ref: Secular)				
Catholic	-0.029 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.040)	-0.053 (0.038)	-0.030 (0.038)
Orthodox	-0.287** (0.122)	-0.296** (0.126)	-0.157 (0.114)	-0.110 (0.120)
Protestant	0.032 (0.043)	0.073* (0.042)	-0.001 (0.041)	-0.019 (0.041)
Muslim	-0.708*** (0.097)	-0.070 (0.093)	-0.740*** (0.094)	-0.097 (0.095)
Other	-0.315*** (0.083)	0.024 (0.077)	-0.246*** (0.081)	-0.032 (0.077)
Marital Status (ref: Married)				
Cohabitating	0.038 (0.067)	0.081 (0.057)	-0.080 (0.059)	0.030 (0.050)
Divorced	-0.036 (0.103)	0.158 (0.105)	0.103 (0.076)	0.019 (0.080)
Separated	-0.138 (0.122)	0.257** (0.121)	0.058 (0.089)	0.276*** (0.086)
Widowed	0.006 (0.317)	0.222 (0.354)	-0.068 (0.339)	-0.339 (0.329)
Single	-0.085** (0.041)	0.119*** (0.041)	0.078** (0.033)	0.193*** (0.034)
Country Level Variables				
Defamilization	0.276*** (0.070)	0.075 (0.070)	0.276*** (0.077)	0.081 (0.076)
Familization	-0.091 (0.068)	-0.147** (0.065)	-0.039 (0.071)	-0.116* (0.060)
Female LF Participation	0.004 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)	0.019** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)

Time Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	2.370*** (0.852)	4.634*** (0.826)	1.437 (0.890)	4.801*** (0.766)
Observations	7341	8785	8637	10892
Akaike Inf. Crit.	22,935.49	28,706.04	26,699.41	36,316.36
Bayesin Inf. Crit.	23,114.84	28,890.08	26,883.00	36,595.99

Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Table 1.6: Multi Level Models with Ciccia and Verloo Measures

	Dependent Variable			
	Working Mothers	Essentialism	Working Mothers	Essentialism
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.00)
Religious Attendance (Never)	0.044*** (0.005)	0.052*** (0.005)	0.044*** (0.005)	0.052*** (0.005)
Sex	0.232*** (0.019)	0.160*** (0.019)	0.232*** (0.019)	0.160*** (0.019)
Education	0.100*** (0.007)	0.053*** (0.007)	0.100*** (0.007)	0.053*** (0.007)
Children	-0.042*** (0.011)	0.020* (0.011)	-0.042*** (0.011)	-0.019* (0.011)
L-R Placement	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)
Employed	0.097*** (0.021)	0.136*** (0.021)	0.097*** (0.021)	0.136*** (0.021)
Religion (ref: Secular)				
Catholic	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.026 (0.028)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.026 (0.028)
Orthodox	-0.193** (0.085)	-0.075 (0.088)	-0.191** (0.085)	-0.067 (0.088)
Protestant	0.017 (0.030)	0.012 (0.029)	0.017 (0.030)	0.013 (0.029)
Muslim	-0.720*** (0.067)	-0.094 (0.067)	-0.720*** (0.067)	-0.095 (0.067)
Other	-0.289*** (0.058)	-0.009 (0.055)	-0.289*** (0.058)	-0.009 (0.055)
Marital Status (ref: Married)				
Cohabitating	-0.024 (0.044)	0.059 (0.038)	-0.024 (0.044)	0.057 (0.038)

Divorced	0.045 (0.061)	0.068 (0.063)	0.045 (0.061)	0.068 (0.063)
Separated	0.003 (0.073)	0.265*** (0.070)	0.003 (0.073)	0.265*** (0.070)
Widowed	0.013 (0.231)	-0.056 (0.241)	0.013 (0.231)	-0.056 (0.241)
Single	0.006 (0.026)	0.157*** (0.026)	0.006 (0.026)	0.158*** (0.026)
Country Level Variables				
Defamilization	0.156 (0.112)	0.008 (0.102)		
Familization	-0.013 (0.068)	-0.143** (0.060)		
Female LF Participation	0.010 (0.008)	-0.019** (0.007)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.018** (0.007)
Fatherhood Index	0.035*** (0.016)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.004 (0.013)
Monetary Value of Care	0.220 (0.305)	-0.457* (0.249)	0.283 (0.306)	-0.428* (0.244)
Gender Concentration Care	-0.012 (0.157)	-0.023 (0.136)	0.016 (0.157)	-0.009 (0.136)
Total Fertility Rate	0.506* (0.276)	-0.324 (0.252)	0.595** (0.269)	-0.314 (0.233)
Welfare State Generosity	-0.006 (0.012)	0.021* (0.011)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.016 (0.010)
Women in Parliament (Cumul.)	-0.016 (0.021)	0.039** (0.019)	-0.007 (0.020)	0.037** (0.017)
Time Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	1.535 (0.971)	4.818*** (0.884)	1.430 (0.968)	4.615*** (0.865)
Observations	15822	19521	15822	19521
Akaike Inf. Crit.	48,996.53	64,388.34	48,988.29	64,383.46
Bayesin Inf. Crit.	49,249.54	64,648.31	49,225.98	64,627.67

Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Table 1.7: Multi Level Models with Alternative Dependent Variables

	Dependent Variable				
	Child Suffers	Family Suffers	Rel. Working Mother	Housewife	Women Want
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)

Religious Attendance (Never)	0.043*** (0.005)	0.048*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.051*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.006)
Sex	0.220*** (0.018)	0.071*** (0.021)	0.219*** (0.017)	0.10*** (0.018)	0.189*** (0.020)
Education	0.101*** (0.007)	0.099*** (0.07)	0.062*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.148*** (0.008)
Children	-0.038*** (0.010)	-0.097 (0.011)	-0.023* (0.010)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.090*** (0.012)
L-R Placement	-0.032*** (0.004)	-0.032*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.004)	-0.048*** (0.005)
Employed	0.100*** (0.020)	0.063*** (0.023)	0.076*** (0.019)	0.130*** (0.020)	-0.013 (0.023)
Religion (ref: Secular)					
Catholic	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.136*** (0.031)	-0.020 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.199 (0.031)
Orthodox	-0.203** (0.082)	-0.272*** (0.086)	-0.010 (0.077)	-0.015 (0.085)	-0.349*** (0.091)
Protestant	0.013 (0.028)	-0.068** (0.032)	-0.015 (0.027)	0.011 (0.028)	-0.146*** (0.033)
Muslim	-0.707*** (0.066)	-0.595*** (0.067)	-0.357*** (0.065)	-0.104 (0.065)	-0.671*** (0.075)
Other	-0.301*** (0.056)	-0.279*** (0.073)	-0.253*** (0.056)	0.010 (0.053)	-0.291*** (0.074)
Marital Status (ref: Married)					
Cohabitating	-0.022 (0.043)	-0.006 (0.072)	-0.076* (0.043)	0.046 (0.036)	-0.042 (0.059)
Divorced	0.021 (0.056)	0.126** (0.061)	0.125** (0.055)	0.075 (0.058)	-0.067 (0.063)
Separated	-0.020 (0.068)	0.099 (0.089)	0.131* (0.067)	0.231*** (0.066)	0.142* (0.080)
Widowed	-0.047 (0.207)	0.347* (0.205)	-0.135 (0.211)	-0.085 (0.222)	-0.032 (0.242)

	-0.010	0.138***		0.144***	
Single	(0.024)	(0.027)	0.045* (0.023)	(0.025)	0.045 (0.028)
Country Level Variables					
	0.304***	0.189***			0.112*
Defamilization	(0.067)	(0.054)	0.082* (0.043)	0.014 (0.069)	(0.060)
	-0.069	-0.055		-0.142**	-0.137**
Familization	(0.066)	(0.051)	-0.031 (0.056)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Time Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	
	2.998***	2.794***		3.237***	4.801***
Constant	(0.331)	(0.202)	3.869*** (0.323)	(0.326)	(0.317)
Observations	17,262	13,516	17,284	21,336	14,443
Akaike Inf. Crit.	53,436.68	42,492.02	51,681.45	70,365.23	46,059.25
Bayesin Inf. Crit.	53,638.31	42,679.77	51,883.11	70,572.37	46256.24

Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

This table demonstrates the general pattern of the relationship between family policies and the two dimensions of gender attitudes holds across different specifications of the dependent variable. Model 3, for the dependent variable relationship with a working mother, is a reverse coded question, and the measure of defamilization just barely misses conventional statistical significance ($p = 0.0612$). In model 5, the alternative dependent variable for essentialist beliefs, the measure of defamilization reaches statistical significance at the $p < 0.10$ level, which perhaps reflects the reduced statistical power that comes from a smaller sample of years and countries. I theorized that for essentialist questions, the level of defamilization may affect attitudes in addition to familization – and this is borne out in this case.

Table 1.8: Multi Level Models with Alternative Lag Structures

	Dependent Variable					
	Essentialism			Working Mothers		
	No Lag	3 Years	7 Years	No Lag	3 Years	7 Years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Religious Attendance	0.051***	0.051***	0.052***		0.043***	0.043***
(Never)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	0.043*** (0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	0.160***	0.160***	0.159***		0.220***	0.220***
Sex	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	0.220*** (0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***		0.100***	0.101***
Education	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	0.101*** (0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Children	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.038* (0.010)	-0.038* (0.010)	-0.038* (0.010)
	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.026***		-0.032***	-0.032***
L-R Placement	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	-0.031*** (0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Employed	0.131***	0.131***	0.133***		0.100***	0.100***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	0.099*** (0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Religion (ref: Secular)						
Catholic	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.027)
					-0.197**	-0.199**
Orthodox	-0.018 (0.085)	-0.017 (0.085)	-0.030 (0.085)	-0.199** (0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Protestant	0.013 (0.028)	0.012 (0.028)	0.011 (0.028)	0.012 (0.028)	0.013 (0.028)	0.010 (0.028)
	-0.104***	-0.104***	-0.103***		-0.707***	-0.707***
Muslim	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	-0.707*** (0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
					-0.302***	-0.302***
Other	0.011 (0.053)	0.011 (0.053)	0.004 (0.053)	-0.302*** (0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Marital Status (ref: Married)						
Cohabitating	0.046 (0.036)	0.046 (0.036)	0.045 (0.036)	-0.021 (0.043)	-0.022 (0.043)	-0.022 (0.043)
	0.230***	0.230***	0.227***			
Divorced	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	0.022 (0.056)	0.021 (0.056)	0.021 (0.056)
Separated	0.075 (0.058)	0.075 (0.058)	0.075 (0.058)	-0.020 (0.068)	-0.020 (0.068)	-0.020 (0.068)

Widowed	-0.085 (0.222)	-0.086 (0.222)	-0.083 (0.222)	-0.047 (0.207)	-0.047 (0.207)	-0.047 (0.207)
Single	0.145*** (0.025)	0.143*** (0.025)	0.145*** (0.025)	-0.010 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.024)
Country Level Variables						
Defamilization	0.051 (0.075)	0.071 (0.076)	0.076 (0.081)	0.172** (0.079)	0.233*** (0.081)	0.295*** (0.083)
Familization	-0.010 (0.057)	-0.097* (0.055)	-0.141** (0.062)	-0.099 (0.066)	-0.055 (0.067)	-0.110* (0.0661)
Female LF Participation	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.017** (0.006)	0.013 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)
Time Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-2.595 (10.530)	3.750*** (0.521)	-4.672 (11.034)	-31.031*** (11.595)	2.388*** (0.564)	-20.669* (10.859)
Observations	21,336	21,336	21,336	17,262	17,262	17,262
Akaike Inf. Crit.	70,349.62	50,374.71	69,197.77	53,419.91	53,449.99	53,410.92
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	70,548.80	70,589.82	69,412.43	53,613.79	53,659.37	53,604.13

Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

In the main text, family policies are lagged at five years – meaning family policies five years ago predict gender attitudes. This is in keeping with the literature suggesting that policy implementation takes time, and that the direct effects of family policy changes might take years to play out, by virtue of individuals facing different opportunity structures and constraints when they form a family and have children (See Unterhofer and Wrohlich, 2017, and Ziefle and Gangl, 2014 for evidence of how changes in family policies affect attitudes). As such, the results become stronger with increasing lags – at no lag (family policies at time *t* predicting gender attitudes at time *t*) there is little evidence of a relationship between the main independent variables (family policy defamilization and familization) and the outcome (attitudes towards working mothers and conservative essentialist beliefs). At the *t-3*, there is evidence of statistical significance, familization is negatively associated with a lack of essentialist beliefs at the 0.10 level, while defamilization is associated with more accepting attitudes towards working mothers at the .05 level. Once we reach a lag of 7 years, both are significant at the .05 level. The results for my main control variable, female labor force participation, also behave in similar ways across different lagged structures and dependent variables; it is negatively (and significantly) associated with increased conservative essentialist beliefs, while it is positively (albeit not significantly) associated with more accepting attitudes towards working mothers.

CHAPTER 2: OPTIONAL FAMILISM AND EDUCATIONAL DIVIDES IN WORK-FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS

Introduction

Can policy alter deep-seated attitudes about work and family life? A recent policy shift in Germany on work-family arrangements provides a unique quasi-experimental setting for studying this question. In 2007, Germany began a reform program intended to boost mothers' workforce participation, address demographic challenges, reduce skill shortages in the labor force, and cater to women voters (Morgan 2013). These reforms marked a departure from its historically traditionalist family policies favoring male breadwinner arrangements. Parental leave, previously two or more years long, was shortened to a year, while payment became tied to a mothers' previous income. Subsidized public childcare became available, though unevenly across municipalities. At the same time, Germany left in place several elements of its historically "familist" policies like generous child allowances, three years of job protection for mothers, and joint taxation.

This 'layering-on' of policies meant to incentivize mothers' return to work alongside the persistence of more traditionalist policies is a configuration of family policies specific to continental Europe that has been termed 'optional familism' (Leitner 2003: 354). Optional familism is unique in that it does not promote a singular family model in the way that Scandinavian family policies support dual earner families or older policies preferred male breadwinning arrangements. Instead, it gives parents the option to use childcare facilities while also supporting families who decide to care for children at home.

If the option to remain a full time carer or transition to a full-time worker is equally available to families, the question becomes: who decides to care and who decides to return to work?

Understanding the effects of family policies on work-family behavior requires considering how the same policies promote different behaviors for families at different class positions. From one perspective, the expansion of childcare and shortening of parental leave significantly increases the returns to work for highly mothers (Zoch 2020). But the continuation of work-reducing policies like joint taxation and child allowances may not similarly transform less-educated mothers' incentive to engage in (full time) employment (Evertesson et al. 2009, Korpi et al. 2013, Morgan and Zippel 2003). Especially because of the policy legacies encouraging full time caregiving for mothers, preferences for the relative balance of work and family likely also diverge, such that differently-educated mothers make different decisions about their use of parental leave and childcare (Hakim 2000, Kangas and Roostgard 2007).

Because the post-reform German policy configuration yields different incentives and preferences for mothers at high and lower levels of education, I expect that the reforms led to greater educational polarization in family models. Highly educated mothers will be more likely to be in dual full-time families, while less educated mothers will remain in time and a half or male breadwinning arrangements. Existing work on these reforms provides only contradictory evidence. Geyer et al. (2014) find increases in employment among mostly lower educated mothers, while Zoch (2020) and Zoch and Hondralis (2018) find the reforms only increased employment among the highly educated.

But no work yet has linked the reforms to class-based differences in work-family arrangements. Pre-reform, Hook (2015) finds the most common pattern of German work-family arrangements were male breadwinner or time and a half family models, with few differences across educational groups. By narrowly comparing those who became new parents before and the reforms, I seek to gain additional insight into how the reforms have shaped work-family arrangements.

I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, coupled with county-level administrative data on childcare availability, to assess how the policy reforms have shaped couple-level earnings trajectories across reform periods. I compare new parents across three groups: pre-reform, post-reform with low county-level childcare availability, and a second post-reform group of couples living in counties with high childcare availability. I use an event study model, previously used by Musick et al. (2020) to investigate cross-national differences in earnings' trajectories, and apply it to this case. This allows me to compare mothers' share of earnings pre and post-birth by both educational attainment and context.

In absolute terms, post-reform college-educated mothers living in counties with high levels of childcare provision had more egalitarian work-family models than their pre-reform counterparts. These mothers return to earning between 40 and 50 % of household income several years after giving birth. In terms of work-family arrangements, these couples appear to be much closer to dual (full-time) earner couples than they resemble male breadwinner or time and a half arrangements that prevailed before the reforms. The same results did not hold for mothers in in counties with lower levels of childcare provision; college educated mothers' earnings trajectories do not differ from the pre-reform period; these mothers continue to earn much lower levels of household income ranging between one quarter to one third of a households' labor market earnings.

Second, there is evidence of a divergence in work-family models between college and non-college educated mothers. Relative to educational differences in a mothers earnings' share in the pre-reform period, the difference between college and non-college educated mothers' share of earnings in counties with greater access to childcare is significant and substantial. This suggests that where the reforms were fully pursued, as measured by levels of childcare availability, there is evidence of a larger educational difference in work-family arrangements. Non-college educated mothers continue to be relatively constrained in their share of earnings, which amount to between a quarter to a third

of household income, whereas college-educated mothers earn fully half of household income in these counties. By contrast, cross-educational differences in counties with lower childcare availability are not statistically significantly different from the pre-reform period.

The results suggest that a new pattern of family arrangements has emerged in Germany that is context dependent, and point to the critical nature of childcare availability in shaping couples' earnings inequality. Where childcare availability has become extensive, families of higher-educated mothers appear to have become more gender egalitarian in their earnings, which has important consequences for a number of other (gendered) behaviors. Conversely, historical patterns of work-family arrangements prevail in counties where childcare expansion was not pursued. The ways in which these new family policies shape families – by offering families choices as to how they reconcile work and care – has generated an educational divide.

At first glance, the turn to optional familism and support for diverse family models seems to be transformative. For example, the reforms affirm a family's right to care (Knijn and Kremer 1997) and provides the financial means for either parent to remain out of the workforce. But in the face of historically traditionalist policies, these policies also reaffirm gender inequalities. In doing so, these reforms actually point to strands of continuity with the Conservative welfare model. Specifically, the reforms create a new version of status preservation and reproduction that has been the historical basis for welfare policy in continental Europe. The childcare reforms facilitate highly educated mothers' return to the workforce while the parental leave benefit maintains their income for the period they are on leave. For less-educated mothers, the incentives embedded in the mix of work-enabling and work-reducing policies preserves their status as caregivers first, and workers second. This status preservation is de-gendered, but only insofar as it is biased towards those with competitive labor market skills. Since the reforms were passed, the optional familism provision has only been strengthened through other reforms in 2013. Therefore, German family policy should not

be seen as moving towards the Scandinavian model. Instead, it should be seen as a new form of the Continental welfare state.

Education and Couples' Earnings Inequality

Class, and education specifically, shape a number of outcomes associated with mothers' workforce participation, earnings equality, and the gendered division of labor in the home (Evertesson et al. 2009, Hook 2015, Korpi et al. 2013, Petit and Hook 2009, Steiber et al. 2016). So how does education shape work-family arrangements? This question begins with decisions about when and how many children to have. Brehm (2020) finds that highly educated mothers in Germany tend to have children in quicker succession to one another, facilitating their return to paid work. Less educated mothers tend to continue to have children for longer periods of time, prolonging the time they spend out of the labor force, which deepens the long-term consequences for their earnings.

After childbirth, education is a key predictor of mothers' labor force participation, such that highly educated women are more likely to be employed (Evertesson et al. 2009, Hook 2015, Korpi et al. 2013, Petit and Hook 2009, Steiber et al. 2016). From a classic economic perspective, higher returns to paid work imply greater (opportunity) cost of remaining out. From a sociological & attitudinal perspective, those with higher levels of education have are more likely to be oriented towards the labor market and more accepting of non-traditional gender roles (Crompton and Lyonette 2005, Hakim 2000). These predictions are generally borne out. Mothers with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to participate in the labor market, do so full-time, and have shorter interruptions around childbirth in ways that reinforce their earnings and position on the labor market (Esping-Andersen 2009, Evertesson et al. 2009). Lower educated mothers have lower levels of attachment to the labor market and tend to have longer interruptions (Gangl and Ziefle 2015).

But most comparative research on the effects of parenthood and family policies often focuses on individual outcomes. Considerable research shows there is a long-lasting, negative impact on mothers' working hours, wages, and career trajectories resulting from career interruptions and care demands from motherhood (England et al. 2016, Hook and Paek 2020, Morrissey 2017, Musick et al. 2020, Weishaar 2018). On top of this, some work shows that there is a fatherhood wage *premium* associated with parenthood for men (Killewald 2013, Glauber 2018). In reality, these changes in family dynamics should be considered relative to one another. After accounting for a mothers' own preferences and potential labor market returns, decisions like whether to enter or leave the workforce are driven by partner-level characteristics like income, working hours, and gender attitudes (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). Mothers therefore face competing "income" and "opportunity cost" effects with regard to participation in the labor market. An income effect exists because despite their own labor market power, women with high-earning partners are more likely to opt-out of the labor market (Alper 2019). The opportunity cost perspective holds that the primary motivator for labor market decisions is a function of education and skill (England et al. 2012).

Overall, mothers' education is associated with greater equality in earnings, because highly educated women have higher rates of employment, working hours, and wages, which is also reflected in more egalitarian gender attitudes and orientation towards the labor market. As educational assortative mating has increased over time, highly educated mothers are increasingly likely to be in relationships with greater equality in earnings (Hook 2015, Klesment and Van Bavel 2017, Steiber et al. 2016).

Understanding gender earnings inequality is important, as it is a proximate causal factor undergirding other gendered couple-level dynamics. While mothers' inclusion in the labor market constituted the first half of the gender revolution, how they fare on the labor market shapes the extent to which the revolution extends *into* the home. Women's share of earnings shapes the ability

of women to advocate for greater equality in the sharing of housework and childcare responsibilities (Brines 1994, Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010), and ability and propensity to exit a relationship (Hobson 1990, Sayer and Bianchi 2000).

The Role of Context

While there is a consistent educational difference in mothers' labor market outcomes and couples' earnings inequality, the magnitude of the educational effect varies across countries and institutional contexts (Drasch 2013, England et al. 2012, Evertesson et al. 2009, Korpi et al. 2013). The configuration of welfare state policies and income inequality give rise to different outcomes across educational groups (Hook 2015, Hook and Paek 2020). Income inequality leads to variations in the educational returns to paid work, such that in the context of higher income inequality, higher educated mothers' returns to work are greater than in countries with lower levels of income inequality. Welfare state policies generate different incentives for mothers of different educational backgrounds to engage in paid work (England et al. 2012, Evertesson et al. 2009, Hook and Paek 2020, Korpi et al. 2013, Misra et al. 2011). Importantly, they also set norms around mother and fatherhood in ways that shape attitudes and behavior (Sjöberg 2004, Jozwiak 2021).

High levels of defamilization, or the extent to which care burdens are removed from families, specifically mothers, are associated with higher levels of women's labor force participation and greater prevalence of dual-earner families (Hook 2015). Shorter but better paid parental leaves, which were instituted with the reforms, encourage workforce re-entry. More important, though, is the availability of (subsidized) childcare for young children when parental leave entitlements expire (Nelson and Stephens 2013). Childcare provision shortens the duration of mothers' work interruptions (Zoch and Hondralis 2018) and increases the probability of labor force re-entry (Bauernschuster and Schlotter 2015, Pettit and Hook 2009, see Morrissey 2017 for a review). Because of its universal design, the provision of childcare services, combined with an expanded

public service sector, increases mothers' overall employment (Misra et al. 2011). Moreover, these policies are associated with greater compression of outcomes by education and class (Hook 2015, Mandel and Seymonov 2005, Mandel and Shalev 2009),

By contrast, policies that *familize* care responsibilities depress women's workforce participation, resulting in greater earnings inequality and the prevalence of time and a half and male breadwinner families. By placing care burdens on mothers, these policies reinforce gender inequalities both in the workplace and at home (Kleider 2015, Petit and Hook 2009). Long unpaid leaves disincentivize workforce return, joint taxation increases the marginal tax rate paid on a second income, and substantial financial support for families with children (through the tax system and child allowances) act as income replacement for paid work (Jaumotte 2003, Korpi et al. 2013, Morgan and Zippel 2003) but reinforce gender inequality (Jacobs and Gerson 2004, Petit and Hook 2009).

German Reforms in Context

Where does Germany sit? Prior to reforms, German family and social policy was geared at supporting a single (male) earner family (Leitner 2008, Saraceno and Keck 2010, Morgan 2013). Parental leave entitlements were first introduced in 1986, with successive extensions that increased the duration of leaves, ultimately up to three years after a child's birth. The parental leave benefit was a low, flat rate paid regardless of a mothers' employment history. A general lack of services provided to families – most notably childcare – combined with part time schooling for young children placed care burdens on families. While childcare for 3-6 year olds is and has been more widely available, take-up rates remained comparatively low. In 1995, Bauernschuster and Schlotter (2015) found enrollment rates of 90% for 5-6 year, 60% of 4 year olds, but only 30% of three year olds. Since 1996, there has been an entitlement to care for 3-5 year olds (*Rechtsanspruch auf einen Kindergartenplatz)*, but until 2008 little support for families with children under three years.

Long leaves and a lack of childcare, combined with generous child benefits, resulted in Germany having some of the lowest labor force participation rate of mothers. Consequently, Hook's (2015) analysis reveals the dominant work-family arrangement in Germany before the reforms was a male breadwinner or time and a half arrangement, with only small differences across educational groups.

Table 2.1: German Family Policy Reforms

	Pre-Reform	Post-Reform
Change	24 month leave benefit at 300 euros/month; shorter option available.	Children born after 1 January 2007: 12 month leave benefit at 67-100% of previous earnings; flat rate available for non-employed mothers. Two fathers' months.
	Little private or public childcare.	2008 childcare reforms leading to 2013 entitlement to childcare place for under threes. Uneven implementation.
Continuity	36 month unpaid, job protected leave Joint Taxation Child Tax Benefits and Allowances	

Parents with children born as of 1 January 2007 became entitled to a shorter, 12 month leave that was now paid in relation to previous earnings (67-100% of previous pay up to 1800 euros). Parents with no employment history were still entitled to the old 300 euro per month flat-rate payment. In addition, there was a separate provision for fathers; two additional 'use-it-or-lose-it' months are reserved for the second parent with the same income-related benefit.

The 2008 Child Welfare Act (*Kinderförderungsgesetz)* put in place an entitlement (as of 2013) for children above the age of one to a place in formal childcare. The implementation of this law varied

widely; states and municipalities had significant discretion over its implementation. Some places, particularly those in the East with a robust childcare infrastructure found no problem meeting demand. Variations in the strength of left-wing government, maternal employment, and Catholic legacies at the local level determined the speed of implementation of the new law elsewhere (Andronescu and Carnes, 2015, Busemeyer and Steitzl 2018). Supply in many areas was so constrained that by 2014, the attendance rate for children under three was only 27% in West Germany (Geyer et al. 2014).

These reforms were pursued for several reasons: to increase skills on the German labor market, combat demographic decline by making it easier to combine work and family, to encourage the labor force participation of mothers, and to cater to women voters (Morgan 2013). While first introduced by the Red/Green coalition in the 2000s, they were not passed until the Grand Coalition came to power. The direction of reforms was contested because of traditional factions of the CDU/CSU that favored continued strong support for traditional family arrangements. As such, the option to pursue a fully Scandinavian model could was not ultimately available to reformers. The resulting set of policies combining elements of traditional policies like child benefits, joint taxation, and long unpaid leaves with childcare and generous parental leave payments and is ultimately a reflection of politics – in particular the importance of Christian Democracy (Huber and Stephens, 2001) and changing welfare state coalitions (Häusermann 2018).

Rather than eliminating older policies, these reforms represented a "layering" on top of older, more traditionalist, policies. Post-reform German family policy resembled neither the typical familist and traditionalist model of the past, nor did it resemble the universalist and more egalitarian Scandinavian model. Instead, it combined high levels of support for familist policies while adding defamilizing policies that expanded childcare and the public service sector. This configuration, also known as 'optional familism,' is a relatively recent emergence in continental Europe. Leitner (2003:

359) describes this configuration as one in which, "the family's right to care [is] not equated with the family's obligation to care."

If the reforms equally facilitate full time caring and employment, then an important question is who makes the decision to remain a full-time carer, and who decides or is able to work full-time. The expansive literature on the interaction of social policy and class can shed light on this question. One issue is that the expectations of outcomes produced by (de)familizing policies somewhat contradict one another. The effects of these policies are often analyzed as separate constructs that in most contexts do not overlap and interact with one another. But under optional familism, (de)familizing policies exist at high levels at the same time, with potentially different consequences for how they affect mothers at different class positions.

A plethora of findings suggest that defamilizing policies like childcare and shorter parental leaves support the formation of dual earner families, especially among mothers with less than a college education (Hook 2015, Korpi et al. 2013, Steiber et al. 2013). The creation of a larger public sector facilitates employment, while the universal and egalitarian design of the programs encourages their use across social class. Defamilization, where it exists alone, should therefore also compress educational stratification of work-family arrangements. By contrast, familizing policies, which include transfers and payments to families, are generally work-reducing and reinforce gender inequality (Petit and Hook 2009, Hook 2015). But they are more likely to do so for those with middling and lower levels of education than for the college-educated (Korpi et al. 2013).

In the context of optional familism, Hook (2015) expects that the income replacement offered by these policies outweighs the incentives to engage in (more) paid employment for middle and lower-educated mothers, producing polarizing patterns of work-family arrangements by class. I extend this argument to more broadly argue that the shift to optional familism presented fundamentally different options to mothers with different levels of education. First, the economic

incentives to engage in paid (full time) work differ by education, but also differ according to the degree to which policies facilitate the reconciliation of paid work and childcare needs. Second, workforce participation and work-family arrangements are also dependent to some degree on individual's preferences. The policy changes, because they allowed for parental choice, facilitated the expression of (previously incongruent) preferences, particularly among highly-educated mothers. But the policy changes themselves also shaped preferences, orienting more mothers towards the labor market.

Education and Returns to Paid Work

The German reforms significantly altered the opportunity costs to employment versus staying home and contained significant labor market activating mechanisms. The new earnings-related structure of the parental leave benefit benefited higher earning mothers by provided more continuous income in the year following childbirth, as compared to the older, poorly paid flat-rate benefit. Second, the sooner expiration of the parental leave benefit resulted in shorter work interruptions and smaller decline in skills and earnings normally associated with motherhood (Ziefle and Gangl 2014, Morgan and Zippel 2003). But for mothers who were marginally or not employed, the income replacement received under the new scheme may have changed or be lower than the payment from the previous flat-rate benefit.

More consequential is the effect of childcare, because affordable and accessible childcare alleviates time pressures and increases the opportunity cost of remaining out of the labor force. This is true regardless of educational attainment, though the relative gains for highly educated women are larger than for mothers those with lower earnings potential. Highly educated mothers with access to childcare were more likely to return to full-time employment (Zoch 2020), which increases their earnings relative to their partners' earnings much more so than part time or marginal employment. Because childcare generates higher returns to work for highly educated mothers, they are more likely

to use it, resulting in a "Matthew effect," whereby the most educated parents are more likely to use public childcare to otherwise outsource care responsibilities. While disadvantaged children benefit more from and might be expected to be more likely to use public and subsidized childcare, Pavolini and Van Lancker (2018) show lower levels of participation in formal childcare among disadvantaged families.

Welfare States, Education, and Work-Family Preferences

Beyond their different returns to work, mothers at different class positions also have different preferences over how the social policy addresses parenthood. An extensive literature connects welfare state policies to citizens' attitudes, vote behavior, and party politics (Garritzmann et al. 2018, Gingrich and Häsermann 2015, Häusermann 2018). As labor market returns to education have increased, highly educated individuals tend to support policies that benefit them, in particular social investment policies that facilitate their employment and future earnings. By contrast, less-educated individuals are more supportive of policies that compensate (for losses in income). Because optional familism provides high levels of both sets of policies, preferences may diverge substantially across educational groups. This appears to be the case; Table 2 shows differences by education in preference for the provider of childcare, with substantially more 'traditional' preferences among the less educated. This divide is also evident in gender attitudes and preferences for leave durations (see Appendix).

Table 2.2: Educational Differences in Childcare Preferences

2012 ISSP				
Best Provider of Childcare				
	Sweden High Ed	Sweden Low Ed	Germany High Ed	Germany Low Ed
Government	85%	82%	43%	31%
Family	7%	12%	43%	52%

Note: Other options (no shown) included: non-profits, private care, employer.

Education also shapes preferences towards work-family arrangements Mothers' decisions to enter or leave the workforce depended on couples' preferences towards the division of labor and separation of work and care spheres (Hakim 2000, Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). College-educated individuals are more likely to prefer more egalitarian divisions of household and paid labor (Usdansky 2011). College educated mothers are more likely to give birth to a second child earlier, speeding up the process of workforce return, while for less educated mothers the periods between births tend to be longer, lengthening the associated labor market penalties (Brehm 2020).

These preferences are inseparable from the structure of the policies themselves, making untangling the relationship between societal attitudes and policy difficult (Pfau-Efinger 2005). From one perspective, German family policy simply caught up or recalibrated to accommodate the preferences of highly educated mothers, while leaving intact the historical 'pathway' for more traditional parents. From another perspective, the reforms themselves also have been repeatedly shown to have also altered societal norms towards working mothers (Zoch and Schober 2017, Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017). But because of the turn to optional familism, there is evidence these preferences remain relatively more conservative, especially among less-educated mothers. For lower-educated mothers who did not work or who were less oriented towards paid work, the reforms may have had little consequences on their preferences or attitudes

Greater educational polarization in mothers' labor market fortunes can therefore be expected where family policies create different incentives across socio-economic groups. There are two mechanisms at play. The structure of the policies after reforms increase the returns to work for highly educated women and the opportunity cost of remaining a full-time caregiver, such that their behavior (and outcomes) diverge from less educated mothers. Second, while there is a complex relationship between culture, policy, and attitudes, differences in preferences for work-family

arrangements and policies associated with education similarly facilitate a larger educational gap in outcomes.

To summarize, the policy changes should be expected to do two things. First, they should lead to greater earnings equality for college-educated mothers. But because they should not similarly transform work-family arrangements for less-educated mothers, the reforms should result in greater educational polarization of family types.

Data & Methods

The bulk of the data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), an annual household database dating to 1984. The data includes yearly information for all members of the household, including income, working hours, employment status, education, and fertility histories. The dependent variable, women's share of household income, is calculated as the ratio of women's gross labor market income to that of the household. Educational status was recoded such that a one indicates women with a tertiary degree (ISCED codes 5 and 6), and a 0 for all other degrees.

Information on county-level childcare availability was collected from the Regional Statistical Offices of the Federal States and attached to respondents' households for each year the data are available (beginning in 2007). Ideally, one would have measures of the availability of childcare spots in each county, but the only available statistics are of the *usage* of childcare facilities, which has been used in other studies as proxies for availability (Zoch 2020). I use this to calculate the childcare ratio, or the number of children under three years old in public childcare facilities as a share of the number of children under three years old in a given county and year. For each year, I then calculate if a county has above (1) or below (0) median childcare coverage. SOEP respondents are assigned to a

high childcare area if their county has above-median childcare availability in the three years after birth, when the availability of childcare for under-threes is likely *most* relevant to that couple.[1]

Because the institutional legacies of motherhood and childcare arrangements in the former the GDR, this study only focuses on West Germany mothers who are married or live with partners. I collect information on couples' earnings dynamics from two years before a childbirth until eight years afterwards. The final sample includes 6,142 observations of 942 native-born German mothers between 18 and 50 who gave birth between 1999 and 2018 and are seen at least twice in the data.

I account for context by creating two 'treatment' variables. The first accounts for whether mothers gave birth to their first child before or after the 2007 parental leave reforms. The second treatment variable accounts for childcare availability for under-threes, which is only available beginning in 2007. The second treatment variable includes three groups: 0 is assigned to pre-reform mothers, 1 indicates a respondent lives in a county with low levels of childcare in the three years after birth, and 2 indicates that respondents live in countries with high levels of childcare provision

Methods

I follow Musick et al.'s (2020) approach to assessing women's income as a share of the household income following childbirth using an event study model. This modelling strategy uses a within (fixed-effects) estimator to estimate changes in mothers' earnings share in the years before and after a first childbirth, while accounting for both context and education. The model can be written as:

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{s=-1}^{8} \gamma_s D_{ist} + \sum_{s=-1}^{8} \delta_{1s} P_i D_{ist} + \sum_{s=-1}^{8} \gamma_s E_i D_{ist} + \sum_{s=-1}^{8} \gamma_s E_i P_i D_{ist} + \beta_1 X_{1it} + \beta_2 X_{2it} + \alpha_i + \mu_i$$

[1] Theoretically, a mother giving birth before the parental leave reform could take advantage of expanded childcare in a child's remaining years under three years old. As a check, I also include pre-reform mothers in the childcare groups, though the results do not substantially differ from the results presented below.

Where Y is the annual share of household gross income earned by women (before taxes and transfers). D is a variable, or counter, running from -2 before childbirth to 8 years after childbirth. Educational differences are measured by E_i, an indicator variable for high or low educational attainment. The Pre/post variable is P_i, which takes on a value of one in the post-reform period. In alternative specifications, a variable M_i is substituted for the pre/post variable capturing whether a county was above or below the yearly median for childcare availability. X_{1it} are fixed effects for age and X_{2it} for year to account for the fluctuations in the effects of motherhood conditional on age and year.

The primary effect of interest is the three-way interaction between the counter, education, and this second treatment variable (pre-period, low childcare K*reis*, and high childcare *Kreis*). In successive models, I include the following time-variant controls: second birth (M1), a husband's labor market characteristics (M2), employment status (M3), and working hours (M4), each of which accounts for different explanations for changes in couples' earnings dynamics. The Appendix shows descriptive figures of the changes in each of the control variables for each pre and post-birth year.

Results

Figure 1 presents the descriptive changes in mothers' share of earnings among couples who had children before and after the German family policy reforms were enacted (by mothers' educational attainment). Before couples have their first child, there is some gender inequality in earnings, but the difference is small when compared to the effect parenthood has on earnings inequality. Consistent with extensive literature on motherhood penalties and household changes associated with parenthood, this changes dramatically when couples become parents. In the year during and following the birth of a first child, mothers' incomes as a share of household income drop dramatically, and only recover very slowly in the years following a first childbirth. Eight years

after giving birth to their first child, mothers only earn between a fifth and a third of household income.

However, the descriptive results suggest there are important differences across educational groups and reform periods. The declines are steepest for women who gave birth under the old regime and those without a college degree. In the pre-reform period and across educational groups, mothers' incomes decline sharply after birth and remain depressed for years after a first childbirth. Importantly, these declines for college educated mothers are largely statistically insignificantly different from mothers without a college education, suggestive of the ways in which pre-reform German family policy strongly preferred family models with a single primary earner and a marginal secondary earner. In the post-reform period, differences across educational groups emerge. College-educated mothers in the post-reform group saw their incomes recover more quickly after childbirth and earned larger shares of household income, approaching one third of household income. Non-college educated mothers fared slightly better under the new policies, but still earned significantly lower shares of household income than their college educated counterparts, only approaching about a quarter by the end of the observation window.

Figure 2.1: Descriptive Data of Earnings' Trajectories



Couples' Earnings Inequality Before and After Reforms: Event Study Analysis

The central question of this paper is to what extent the reforms reshaped the gendered division of income for couples with different educational attainments. To investigate this first question, Figure 2 shows results from the first set of fixed-effects regression models. These compare women's earnings before and after birth interacted with a pre-post indicator variable indicating whether or not the couple had their first child before or after the reforms came into effect for children born since January 2007, with fixed effects for year and age (N = 6,143 of 942 couples). Because the results are more easily interpretable by figures than tables, I present a series of figures and include the full regression outputs in the Appendix. The figures presented below show the predicted values from the event study models for each of the years, both before and after birth. In

each case, T=2 is the year in which mothers gave birth to their first child. Each line in the models represents a different subpopulation being analyzed.

Figure 2.2: Event Study Baseline Model, Pre- and Post-Reform



The results show striking differences across reform periods and educational groups. In the pre-reform group, mothers' earnings decline after birth and remain lower than their pre-birth levels, which holds across college and non-college educated mothers. The group that stands out are college educated mothers who gave birth after the reforms. Couples with college-educated mothers tended to have less earnings inequality in the years following childbirth, and their share of earnings many years after childbirth tend to more closely resemble their pre-birth division of household income. By contrast, every other group, including couples with less than college education had similar trajectories in earnings inequality as compared to the pre-reform groups.

This shows initial evidence that, at least as couples earnings dynamics are concerned, the reforms did result in a larger educational gap. Specifically, couples with non-college educated mothers closely resemble the pre-reform German model of a primary male breadwinner and a secondary female earner, with significant gender gaps in couples' earnings. By contrast, highly educated couples more closely resemble a family pattern more common among Scandinavian families, with two full time earners (and carers). But, they also resemble patterns of highly educated mothers in liberal countries, like the United States, where there is similar educational polarization of work-family arrangements.

Analysis With Childcare Data

To assess to what extent these changes are associated with changes in parental leave and childcare availability, I move to a second set of models that contain multiple treatment groups conditional on childcare availability. While mothers who gave birth after January 2007 were newly entitled to a year of leave at higher pay, there was great internal variation in Germany in terms of their access to the second important component of the reforms, subsidized childcare. Even with shortened leaves that encourage workforce re-entry, couples without access to (full-time) childcare might curtail mothers' ability to participate in (full-time) employment, with a cascading series of consequences for their earnings and couples' earnings inequality.

The next sets of analyses compare couples' earnings dynamics conditional on whether or not they lived in counties with high levels of childcare availability when their first child was under three years old, as the effect of childcare on women's return to work and earnings is concentrated in those early post-birth years and after leave entitlements expire.

I also directly test the hypothesis that the educational gap in couples' earnings inequality will rise with the shortening of parental leave and expansion of childcare, because these policies might privilege college-educated mothers with greater labor market returns. It is important to note that a larger educational divide in mothers' share of earnings might not be normatively desirable, even if it

is a likely outcome. In fact, a small educational gap coupled with an equivalent post-reform boost in earnings' share for all mothers is likely preferred. In the following results, we can examine whether changes to mothers' earning share are driven by increases in college-educated mothers' employment or by a combination of college and non-college educated mothers.

Figure 2.3: Comparing Pre-Period and Counties with High Childcare Usage



Figure 3 shows mothers' predicted shares of earnings for each of the years before and after birth compared to the pre-reform period. The immediate difference of note is that college educated mothers' share of household income remains significantly higher than any other group, differences which in most years are statistically significantly different from both college-educated mothers in the pre-period and non-college educated mothers in the post-reform high childcare group. Couples with college-educated mothers in these counties seem to have very low levels of earnings inequality,

approaching nearly half of household earnings in later post-birth years. Their earnings trajectory is much more in line with that of a dual (full-time) earner family type model than any other group. Importantly, none of the interactions with the counter (year before and after birth) are significant, indicating that the post-reform groups are subject to a similarly-shaped penalty for each year compared to pre-birth years.

For non-college educated mothers, the difference in their share of earnings compared to the pre-reform period is only statistically significantly higher at T=4 and 5, but those differences become insignificant in later post-birth years. This period corresponds to the time when pre-reform mothers likely would otherwise have been on parental leave. While non-college educated mothers' earnings inequality might initially recover more quickly after birth, their overall earnings trajectories are not significantly altered in counties with high levels of childcare usage. Their predicted earnings remain low, between a quarter and a third of household earnings, more consistent with a time and a half family model that has historically been prevalent.

Comparing the overall results to one another, the difference between highly educated and less educated couples' earnings trajectories in high childcare counties post-reforms are statistically different from one another in all years after birth. By comparison, in the pre-reform period, educational differences in earnings are not statistically distinguishable. Next, I examine the reform group (pre or post with high childcare) by education differences in predicted earnings share. The difference between educational groups is larger (0.201 at T=4, $p<0.01$) and statistically significant when comparing the high childcare counties to mothers who gave birth pre-reforms (See the first row of Table 2 for results across a range of post-birth years).

This is evidence that – at least in the counties with greater childcare availability – the reforms led to wider educational disparities in couple's earnings inequality. Before the reforms, all mothers experienced similar earnings inequality and trajectories after birth that are consistent with a single

earner with a part time earner model. Post-reform, highly educated mothers' households more closely resemble dual-full time earner 'types,' while for less educated mothers it resembles the historically-prevalent time and a half model.

Figure 2.4: Comparing Pre and Counties with Low Childcare Usage



There are no substantial differences when comparing mothers' predicated share of earnings between the pre-reform group and post-reform, low childcare counties. The range of predicated earnings shares is much narrower, and differences across subgroups are generally not statistically significant from one another. Moreover, the educational by reform period differences (the difference in difference of educational gap by reform group) compared in mothers' earnings do not statistically differ from one another (See Table 2). In other words, the educational gap did not grow in these counties as it did in the counties with higher levels of childcare availability.

While the point estimates for couples with a college-educated mother are higher, their share of earnings does not significantly differ from pre-reform college educated mothers. Moreover, the estimates suggest that college-educated couples still experience significant earnings inequalities in this context. At their lowest post birth at T=6, these mothers earn a 24.6% of household income, and the highest point at T-9 is 34% of household income, which more closely approximates a time and a half earner model, as compared to college-educated couples in high childcare counties, where these couples earned roughly equal shares of earnings that resembled dual-earner models. Lastly, the lower precision of the estimates for college-educated mothers in counties with lower childcare availability is potentially the result of a small sample (N =482 of 71 couples).

Lastly, do counties of high childcare provision differ in their educational gaps from counties of low childcare provision? An educational gap in the post-reform counties would provide some additional evidence that the expansion of childcare is the critical policy instrument driving changes in mothers' share of earnings. A tentative answer is that there is that the average difference in mothers' earnings in the counties with high levels of childcare usage is higher than the educational gap in mothers' earnings in counties with lower levels of childcare usage. The differences are significant at the 0.10 level, and results for a full set of models is shown in the Appendix Table 2.7, and a figure of the baseline results is in the Appendix Figure 2.5. The lack of estimate precision is again perhaps the result of the smaller sample of college-educated mothers in counties with lower levels of childcare usage. Moving across models, these differences do become statistically significant at the 0.05 level when considering differences in second births, fathers' employment status and fathers' logged earnings.

What accounts for these changes?

The previous models show the results based on baseline models without accounting for several other factors that might shape couples' earnings inequity. For example, changes in couples'

earnings inequality resulting from the reforms could be due to changes in fertility patterns, changes to male employment, and changes to women's employment and wages. In fact, the expected effect and intention behind the reforms was to increase mothers' labor force participation. Marginal increases in employment after birth, especially if it happens sooner after a childbirth, might result in smaller penalties relative to her share of earnings before childbirth. Moreover, educational differences in employment differences are to be expected, as previous research on these reforms has found the effects on employment to be highest among highly educated mothers (Zoch 2020, Zoch and Hondralis 2018).

To examine which components of couples' labor market behavior drive the changes in couples' earnings dynamics, I estimate subsequent models which include controls for mothers' employment status, and present again the predicted probabilities of mothers' share of household earnings. I follow Musick et al. (2020) in also estimating models that successively build on one another, including indicators for second childbirths (M1), plus husband's gross logged labor earnings and employment status (M2), plus her employment (M3), and a mothers' working hours (M4).

Table 2.3: Context by Education Differences in Mothers' Share Income

	Context by Education Differences in Mothers' Earnings Share					
	High CC			Low CC		
	+2	+5	+8	+2	+5	+8
M0	0.201***	0.284***	0.243***	0.045	0.137	0.037
	(0.049,0.352)	(0.126, 0.442)	(0.067, 0.418)	(-0.137, 0.227)	(-0.055, 0.329)	(-0.179, 0.252)
M1	0.173**	0.258***	0.211**	0.034	0.111	0.008
	(0.023, 0.323)	(0.102, 0.417)	(0.037, 0.385)	(-0.146, 0.214)	(-0.079, 0.301)	(-0.205, 0.221)
M2	0.182***	0.290***	0.242***	0.007	0.075	-0.063
	(0.056, 0.306)	(0.161, 0.420)	(0.098, 0.385)	(-0.141, 0.154)	(-0.080, 0.230)	(-0.148, 0.023)
M3	0.056	0.129***	0.084*	0.009	0.075	-0.052
	(-0.022, 0.134)	(0.048, 0.210)	(-0.006, 0.174)	(-0.083, 0.101)	(-0.021, 0.172)	(-.161, 0.057)
M4	0.005	0.061*	0.029	0.002	0.037	-0.043

(-0.055, 0.067)	(-0.003, 0.124)	(-0.042, 0.099)	(-0.069, 0.075)	(-0.039, 0.113)	(-0.216, 0.131)

Note: The results show the difference in difference, or the difference in the predicted share of women's earnings by educational group for each of the treatment groups, relative to the pre-reform group. The numbers in parenthesis are the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The results come from post-estimation commands (lincom) in STATA. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2 shows the difference in mothers' predicted share of earnings between educational groups for low and high childcare counties compared to the education-based difference in earnings' share in the pre-reform era for each model specification. The first three columns show this difference in predicted earnings for counties with high levels of childcare provision. The difference in the post-birth years shown here is statistically significant, which in substantive terms means the educational gap in earnings' share is higher in counties with greater access to childcare as compared to the reform period.

Moving across models helps to better understand which components of a couples' economic characteristics help account for this difference. Model 1 adds second births, which somewhat reduces the estimates (though the difference in models is not significant), perhaps because most mothers have a second birth during the observation window. Model 2 adds to this model fathers' characteristics (employment status and logged earnings), which actually increases the difference in estimates, gap. Model 3, which adds mothers' year to year employment status significantly reduces these estimates, rendering the differences not significant two years after her first childbirth and renders the last estimate significant only at the 0.10 level. Moreover, the point estimates are substantially reduced, suggesting variations in employment status pre and post reform account for much of the change in the educational divide. Adding her working hours, which Model 4 does, further brings the estimates of the educational divide in earnings share across reform periods closer to zero. This is illustrative evidence that differences in mothers' employment post birth account for a substantial proportion of the growing educational gap in counties with greater access to childcare.

A similar pattern is not found when comparing counties with low childcare availability to the pre-reform period. Moving across the models for counties with lower than median levels of childcare availability, in no case is the difference in mothers' earnings *before* the reforms between college and non-college educated mothers significantly different from the educational gap in mothers' share of earnings after the reforms. In other words, the educational gap in couples' earnings inequality in regions with less childcare provision is statistically the same compared to the pre-reform period. This, coupled with the previous results, has important implications for earnings' inequality. In the first set of analyses, mothers' share of earnings in these counties were lower in absolute terms, hovering between a quarter and a third of household income even eight years after birth. This suggests the context of lower childcare availability limits' mothers' earnings potential and results in patterns of work-family arrangements more consistent with historically familistic policies. Finally, the effects seem particularly limiting for mothers with a college degree, as their earnings share increased dramatically in counties with higher levels of childcare availability.

Discussion and Conclusion

In Hook's (2015) cross-national examination of work-family patterns across educational divides, she hypothesized that the particular configuration of family policies enabling "optional familism" would be associated with significant educational polarization in family models. This study puts this hypothesis to the test within the German case, where historically familist policies were supplemented with provisions meant to enable women's greater involvement in paid work, resulting in greater flexibility for how parents combine work and care.

The German reforms did two things at roughly the same time: they shortened parental leave and expanded availability of childcare for under threes, which was previously non-existent. Because of the uneven nature of the expansion of childcare across German counties, these reforms offer a unique opportunity to examine the consequences of either reform on couples' earnings inequality

after birth. The results suggest that the effects are attributable to the expansion of childcare spots for children under three years old. There is no evidence to suggest that changes to parental leave led to any significant differences in mothers' share of earnings.

Importantly, there is also little evidence that the reforms reduced the relative earnings penalty associated with motherhood. There is no difference in the penalty associated with motherhood in individual years after childbirth; instead, there is simply a general effect attributable to being a college educated mother in a county with high levels of childcare availability.

Second, the results point to a widening educational divide in couples earnings' inequality. In counties with high levels of childcare availability, the education-based difference compared to the pre-reform period, meaning that post-reform college-educated mothers earn much higher shares of household income compared to their less educated counterparts and college-educated mothers pre-reform. The counties with high levels of childcare are those who expanded childcare to the greatest extent, and are the counties that best exemplify the 'optional familist' model to which Germany has transitioned. The prediction that optional familism leads to greater educational inequalities in outcomes, therefore, is largely borne out in Germany.

Why did the reforms not significantly alter non-college educated mothers' earnings trajectories after reform? There are several potential explanations. First, an unobservable characteristic that might mediate this relationship is the structure and availability of paid work for lower-educated mothers. Given the rise of feminized part time employment, it should not be surprising that greater levels of employment do not translate to substantial increases in earnings. Second, the historical legacy of familism and the way it has shaped patterns of gender attitudes and preferences for different types of social policy associated with parenthood might lead to selection into different arrangements after childbirth.

Recent updating to family policy in Germany has strengthened the provisions of family policy that encourage educational divides to emerge. Since the reforms of the 2000s, German family policy has strengthened policies that can be considered 'optional familism.' which. Two additional provisions, enacted after these reforms, allow more choice and flexibility as to how parents reconcile care and work. Since 2013, parents can opt for a childcare allowance paid directly to the family if they choose not to send their children to formal childcare. Meanwhile, some states offer higher than mandated child allowances that serve as income replacement for mothers' income. Finally, from 2015, parents may opt to take two years of leave at half the monthly pay, during which they are also allowed to work part time, potentially prolonging a return to full-time employment.

Rather than reading off these results as evidence of a simple divide that falls along educational lines, this study reflects other work demonstrating how educational divides are reshaping European societies and politics. This paper shows that welfare states 'secure' families in ways that are patterned by the interaction of gender and class. Historically, continental welfare states policies were aimed at status preservation when risk events like sickness, unemployment, and old age occurred. Parenthood – a new social risk – was historically not covered because of the welfare states' reliance on family care for children and the elderly. But the outcomes produced by these reforms are also status preserving, just this time in a gender-neutral way. College educated mothers' earnings appear to be protected in the context where childcare availability has been expanded. The reforms preserve relatively privileged college-educated mothers' ability to be full time workers. At the same time, their less-educated counterparts remain in their historical pattern of significant loss of earnings following the beginning of parenthood. As a whole, instead of encouraging gender egalitarian behaviors in the labor market and at home, the reforms seem to institutionalize a class/educational divide in gendered work-family arrangements, with consequential downstream implications for gender attitudes and gendered divisions of labor.

What are the implications for gender equality? The reforms reaffirm a family's right to care for a young child without forcing care burdens upon mothers. This greater flexibility for family choice in work-family arrangements resonates with contemporary feminist discourses of choice that frames any decisions to remain at work or at home as feminist ones. But what is considered egalitarian is largely context dependent – evidence suggests the presence of familizing policies, even alongside defamilizing ones, still results in essentialist conceptions of gender norms, even if attitudes towards mothers in the workplace change (Jozwiak 2021). These multiple and competing images of what is 'feminist' and what is 'egalitarian,' formalized in policy, potentially undergirds the continued political conflict in Germany over gender issues.

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APPENDIX

Table 2.4: Educational Differences in Gender Attitudes

2012 ISSP				
Response to Family Life Suffers if the Mother Works				
High Ed	Sweden	Norway	W. Germany	France
High Ed Mean	*4.1*	*3.75*	*3.64*	*3.72*
Low Ed Mean	*3.72*	*3.49*	*3.06*	*3.19*
Difference	*0.38*	*0.26*	***0.58***	***0.53***
Response to Household is Wife's Job, a Husband's Is to Work				
High Ed	Sweden	Norway	W. Germany	Austria
High Ed Mean	*4.54*	*4.43*	*4.36*	*3.79*
Low Ed Mean	*4.21*	*4.05*	*3.5*	*3.09*
Difference	*0.33*	*0.38*	***0.86***	***0.7***
Response to Being a Housewife is As Fulfilling As Working				
High Ed	Sweden	Norway	W. Germany	Austria
High Ed Mean	*3.32*	*3.42*	*3.51*	*3.48*
Low Ed Mean	*3.11*	*3.35*	*3*	*2.98*
Difference	*0.21*	*0.07*	***0.51***	***0.5***
Response to What Women Really Want is a Home and Child				
High Ed Mean	*3.93*	*3.94*	*4.17*	*3.77*
Low Ed Mean	*3.47*	*3.55*	*3.43*	*3.14*
Difference	*0.46*	*0.39*	***0.74***	***0.63***

Note: Survey weights applied

Table 2.5: Leave Preferences

High/Low Ed determined by Tertiary degree Yes/No (highest ISCED category)					
2012 ISSP					
Paid Leave Yes/No, How Long					
	Sweden	Norway	W. Germany	Austria	France
High Ed	16.88	12.47	15.7	25.9	10.6
Low Ed	16.58	12.7	16.3	28.8	13.8
Difference	0.3	-0.23	-0.6	-2.9	-3.2

Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Women's Share Income	6,143	0.2389435	0.2503698	0	1
Counter	6,143	4.495686	2.831466	0	10
College Degree	6,143	0.3791307	0.4852102	0	1
Age	6,143	32.86017	5.220643	18	50
Year	6,143	2008.967	5.321451	1998	2018

2nd Birth	6,143	0.2503663	0.4332592	0	1
Employed	6,143	0.6351945	0.4814148	0	1
Hours Worked	6,054	18.53994	17.57946	0	50
Log Man Income	6,143	8.022548	0.6231247	0	9.93487
Partner's Employment	6,143	0.9544197	0.2085902	0	1
Treatment	6,143	0.7634706	0.8591192	0	2
Median Childcare	4,037	0.5536289	0.4971772	0	1

Figure 2.5: Median Childcare Ratio by Year



Note: The quantity plotted here is the median, for each year the data are available, of West German childcare usage rates, which are calculated as the proportion of under-threes in care relative to the population in a given county under three years old. Data from German Regional Statistical Offices.

Figure 2.6: Post-Period, Comparison Between High and Low Childcare Usage



Figure 2.7: Mothers' Employment by Treatment Group



Figure 2.8: Mothers' Working Hours by Treatment Group

Table 2.7: Educational Differences in Earnings' Share Before and After Reforms

Context by Education Differences					
High CC			Low CC		
+2	+5	+8	+2	+5	+8
0.201***	0.284***	0.243***	0.045	0.137	0.037
(0.049,0.352)	(0.126, 0.442)	(0.067, 0.418)	(-0.137, 0.227)	(-0.055, 0.329)	(-0.179, 0.252)

Note: The results show the difference in difference, or the difference in the predicted share of women's earnings by educational group for each of the treatment groups, relative to educational difference in pre-reform group. The numbers in parenthesis are the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The results come from post-estimation commands (lincom) in STATA for the baseline model (M0). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 2.8: High and Low Childcare Comparisons of Educational Differences in Mothers' Earnings Share

Context by Education Differences			
	High vs Low Childcare		
	+2	+5	+8
M0	0.155*	0.148	0.206*
	(-0.030, 0.341)	(-0.050, 0.345)	(-0.024, 0.436)
M1	0.14	0.147	0.203*
	(-0.043, 0.322)	(-0.478, 0.342)	(-0.240, 0.431)
M2	0.175**	0.215***	0.284***
	(0.023, 0.326)	(0.054, 0.375)	(0.098, 0.471)
M3	0.047	0.054	0.136**

	(-0.048, 0.141)	(-0.046, 0.154)	(0.020, 0.252)
M4	0.002	0.024	0.091*
	(-0.071, 0.077)	(-0.055, 0.102)	(0.000, 0.183)

Note: The results show the difference in difference, or the difference in the predicted share of women's earnings by educational group for each of the treatment groups, relative to the pre-reform group. The numbers in parenthesis are the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The results come from post-estimation commands (lincom) in STATA. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 2.9: Models with Quantities of Interest

Mothers' Share Income					
	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4
Treatment Group x College (Ref: Pre-Period)					
Low CC X College	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03
High CC x College	0.21*	0.19*	0.19*	0.05	0.00
College Degree (Ref: No College)	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03
Second Birth		-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.02*	-0.00
Partner Income (Log)			-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.09*
Partner Employment Status			-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.03*
Employment Status				0.27*	0.10*
Working Hours					0.01*
Survey Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.32	0.3	1.16	0.87	0.74
R^2 Within	0.26	0.28	0.41	0.77	0.85
R^2 Overall	0.13	0.16	0.28	0.7	0.83
sigma_u	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.1	0.07
sigma_e	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.09	0.07
rho	0.56	0.55	0.54	0.55	0.52

Table 2.10: Full Models at Post-Birth Times

Mothers' Share Income					
	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4
Counter (Ref: Two Years Pre Birth)					
-1	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01
0	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.09*	-0.02	0.01
1	-0.31*	-0.32*	-0.27*	-0.09*	0.02
2	-0.28*	-0.29*	-0.23*	-0.09*	0.02
3	-0.22*	-0.21*	-0.16*	-0.07*	0.03
4	-0.18*	-0.15*	-0.09*	-0.06*	0.03
5	-0.16*	-0.13*	-0.05	-0.05	0.04

6	-0.13*	-0.10	-0.02	-0.04	0.03
7	-0.13	-0.09	-0.01	-0.04	0.04
8	-0.10	-0.06	0.02	-0.04	0.04
Counter at Low CC (Ref: Pre-Reform)					
-1	0.05	0.04	-0.02	0.01	0.01
0	-0.05	-0.05	-0.09*	-0.01	0.02
1	0.06	0.05	-0.02	0.00	0.02
2	0.10*	0.10*	0.02	0.00	0.02
3	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.01
4	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.01	0.02
5	0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.01	0.01
6	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.03
7	0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.04
8	0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.02	0.05*
Counter at High CC (Ref: Pre-Reform)					
-1	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.00
0	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06*	-0.01	0.01
1	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01
2	0.11*	0.12*	0.06	0.03	0.03
3	0.10*	0.09*	0.03	0.02	0.03
4	0.06	0.06	-0.01	0.02	0.03
5	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.00
6	0.04	0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.02
7	0.07	0.07	-0.01	0.00	0.02
8	0.04	0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.02
Counter x College (Ref: No College)					
-1	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
0	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.00
1	0.07*	0.08*	0.06*	0.01	0.01
2	0.08*	0.08*	0.08*	0.02	0.01
3	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.00
4	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.00
5	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02
6	-0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.00
7	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01
8	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01
Counter X High CC X College (Ref: Pre-Period)					
-1	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01
0	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	0.00
1	-0.09	-0.10	-0.07	-0.02	-0.01

2	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.01
3	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.00
4	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
5	0.08	0.07	0.10*	0.08*	0.06*
6	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.04	0.02
7	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03
8	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03
Counter X Low CC X College (Ref: Pre-Period)					
-1	-0.07	-0.07	0.00	-0.03	-0.03
0	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04
1	-0.08	-0.08	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04
2	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02
3	0.12*	0.11	0.07	0.02	-0.01
4	0.05	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.05
5	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.01
6	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.01
7	0.08	0.06	0.02	-0.02	-0.05
8	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.09*	-0.09*

CHAPTER 3: GENDER ATTITUDES, SOCIAL SORTING, AND POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Introduction

Female labor force participation and educational attainment have continued to rise over the past decades, which led gender attitude scholars to be cautiously optimistic about the future of egalitarian attitudes (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Yet recent studies are more skeptical, demonstrating that gender attitudes are either stalling, (Cotter, et al., 2011) becoming more traditional (Pepin and Cotter, 2018), or diverging across sub-dimensions of attitudes (Grunow, et al. 2018, Knight and Brinton, 2017).

Over this same period, a growing partisan split in gender attitudes has emerged – Democrats are more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes, while Republicans hold relatively more traditional ones. In a 2017 Pew Survey, 69% of those who identified as Democrats said the country "hasn't gone far enough" to promote gender equality, while only 26% of Republicans said the same (Horowitz, et al., 2017). The 2016 presidential election brought this into sharp focus; a number of studies identified sexism and/or gender attitudes as playing a role in shaping support for then-candidate Trump (Bracic, et al. 2019, Cassese and Holman, 2019, Strolovitch, et al. 2016, Valentino, et al., 2017). But Democrats and Republicans have not historically been so divided in their gender attitudes. This raises an important question – is partisanship itself driving gender attitudes, or does social sorting and partisan realignment mean that those more likely to hold gender egalitarian beliefs find themselves identifying as Democrats, and those with more traditional beliefs as Republicans?

Traditionally, gender attitudes are thought to be the product of a combination of childhood socialization and early adult experiences like religiosity, region, and family (Davis and Greenstein,

2009, Fan and Marini, 2000, McLanahan and Percheski, 2008, Pepin and Cotter, 2018, Sutfin, et al., 2008) and contextual factors like feminist mobilization, female workforce participation, and regional gender norms (Scarborough and Sin 2020, Shorrocks 2018). Gender attitudes are thought to be less closely related to politics than attitudes about policy issues or, in the U.S. context, race (Engelhardt 2019).

But there are two reasons why this is an incomplete picture. As demographic bases of parties have shifted, the parties have increasingly clarified their positions on gender issues (Costain, 1991, Wolbrecht, 2000). The Republican party has been the party of "traditional" values and families, while the Democratic party is associated with the feminist movement and more egalitarian gender roles in ways that voters do perceive (Winter 2010). Partisanship has become an increasingly central attitude and social identity, and plays a much greater force in politics than it once did (Hetherington, 2001, Mason, 2018). One of the consequences of the increased importance of partisanship is that individuals update their preferences and attitudes based on messages they receive from the parties on any number of issues (Bartels, 2002, Bolsen et al. 2014, Goren, 2005, Lenz, 2012).

While partisanship itself shapes gender attitudes in a new era of polarization, I also argue the role of the increasing social distinctiveness of the parties facilitates the adoption of more partisan-consistent gender attitudes. In other words, I argue the role of partisanship on attitudes is conditional on the extent to which an individuals' social characteristics align with their partisan identities. Recent work on the effects of social sorting on American politics has found that individuals whose social groups align with their partisanship are more likely to express stronger levels of partisan identification (Mason and Wronski 2018). In turn, those stronger partisans are more likely to adopt their parties' beliefs, and this is especially true for those active in politics (Lenz 2012). This has important implications for gender attitudes. As the parties have become more socially distinct, the same social groupings that are generally associated with a particular party – like

religion, race, and ideological orientation – are also tightly associated with the characteristics promoting distinct sets of gender attitudes. The extent to which an individual has more party-aligned social characteristics might reinforce both their partisanship and their gender attitudes.

This paper uses these explanations to better understand why and how partisans increasingly hold more distinct sets of gender attitudes. First, I use GSS data from 1977, 1985-2018 to show trends in gender attitudes are diverging by partisan identity over time. Partisanship is not a predictor of gender attitudes when these questions are first introduced to the GSS in the 1970s and 1980s, but partisan identity becomes and remains a strong and substantive predictor of gender attitudes by the late 1990s. The effects are asymmetrical; Democrat's gender attitudes significantly change over time, and change among Republicans is smaller.

The second part of the analysis examines the causal dynamics underpinning the relationship between gender attitudes and partisanship. I do this by analyzing the ANES panel from 1992-1994, the GSS Panel from 2006 to 2010, and the VOTER panel survey from 2016-2019. These capture three snapshots, over the course of which the salience of gender issues for parties and the centrality of partisanship to political competition increased. Using cross-lagged regression models previously used by Engelhardt (2019), I find evidence that more recently, partisanship becomes a stronger predictor of gender attitudes. This suggests that partisans are, on the margins, updating their gender beliefs, leading to increasingly distinct sets of gender attitudes on either side of the partisan divide.

In a next step, I assess whether better-sorted partisans are more likely to update their gender attitudes. Using GSS panel data from 2006 to 2008, I explore the role of party-aligned social identities on the propensity to have both more coherent and more distinct gender attitudes. I show that better-sorted partisans are more likely to adopt distinct and more coherent gender attitude profiles. Moreover, I find evidence that across all levels of partisan identification, the effect of sorting on gender attitudes is only greater than zero at a higher level of sorting. This is initial

evidence that while partisanship plays some role in shaping gender attitudes, there is a more powerful effect where individuals' social identities align with partisanship.

These diverging trends in gender attitudes shed light on the pressing question of why the gender revolution is incomplete, at least in the United States. Gender attitudes, which are thought to be the product of micro- and macro-level socialization factors, have become tied to politics as the issue has become politicized. As a result, distinct frames around gender have emerged on either side of the partisan divide. Specifically, gender scholars have noted the emergence of choice feminist and 'egalitarian essentialist' frames (Crompton and Lyonette 2005, Scarborough et al. 2019) that blend egalitarian and traditional elements. Rather than seeing these as stopping points on the road to egalitarianism, their relevance and proximity to politics means these are likely enduring features of the social landscape.

Gender Attitude Formation and Change

Gender attitudes are the multi-dimensional set of beliefs about gendered and separate spheres in life (Davis and Greenstein, 2009). Gender attitude formation and change occurs on two levels. At the micro-level, gender attitudes are molded by an individual's family environment (Sutfin et al, 2008). As individuals age, their own experiences and peers take on increased importance in forming their expectations and outlooks on gender, especially as they make decisions about forming households of their own (Davis, 2007). At the macro-level, gender attitudes have been shown to change as a result of women's employment, education, policy context, and societal-level changes resulting from (feminist) movements or news media (Bolzendahl and Meyers, 2004, Cotter et al., 2011, Scarborough and Sin 2020, Shorrocks, 2018).

More recently, there is evidence that there is some plateauing or reversal in gender attitudes, especially among younger Americans (Pepin and Cotter 2018, Dernberger and Pepin 2020). Specifically, issues of traditionally gendered roles or 'essentialist' beliefs about women's roles in

society have seen stagnation or reversal, while attitudes towards women in the workplace have continued to become more egalitarian. In effect, these attitudes reflect expectations of women experiencing the second shift – that at least in the United States, changing gender norms about women as breadwinners has not come alongside changes in norms about who does what at home (Pepin and Cotter 2018).

At the same time as aggregate trends are changing, there is growing evidence of a partisan split in gender role attitudes. To show this, I examine the association between different measures of gender attitudes and partisan identity in the pooled General Social Survey. The strength of the association grows over time, with more traditional attitudes associated with stronger Republican identification, and more egalitarian attitudes associated with stronger Democratic identification (see Appendix A). In the 1977 GSS, the correlation is negative and insignificant, rising to 0.10 in the 1990s and peaking at around 0.27 in 2018. These are surprisingly strong correlations; for context, Engelhardt (2019) finds correlations of racial attitudes and partisanship between 0.20 and 0.5.

Figure 3.1: Predicted Gender Attitudes by Party Identification in 1977 and 2016



Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of partisanship on a three-question gender attitude scale[2] in two years, 1977, the first year gender attitude these questions were asked, and 2016 (with controls). The effect over the range of the seven-point PID is not statistically significant in 1977. Gender egalitarians and traditionalists were found in both the Republican and Democratic parties. By 2016, a shift from strong Democrat to strong Republican identification is associated with a half a standard deviation shift in the gender attitude scale. This serves as initial evidence that gender attitudes are associated with party identification, and that this effect has grown stronger over time.

Partisanship and Updating of Gender Attitudes

This raises an important question: is the growing gap between partisans on gender attitudes and association between attitudes and partisanship driven by the sorting of similarly-minded individuals and groups into either party, or is this the result of partisanship-induced attitudinal updating? There is some evidence that partisan-induced updating has affected attitudes on race (Englehardt (2019)), and the central question explored here is whether the same pattern exists for gender attitudes.

Parties' messages on gender are subtler than on race. They have an effect though; the heightened salience of gender issues in 2016 resulted in a highly sorted public on the basis of their gender attitudes and levels of sexism (Cassese and Holman, 2019). Beyond the salience of gender issues in a particular electoral cycle, the parties have become more divided over issues of gender, including sexual harassment, abortion, and work-family reconciliation policies (Costain, 1991, Wolbrecht, 2000). The Republican coalition that includes evangelical Christians has made it the party of "traditional family values," while the Democratic coalition that included successive waves of the

[2] I also create a scale of gender attitudes created from three questions: "Generally speaking, it is better for a man to work and a woman to tend to the home?" "A working mother can have just as warm a relationship with her child as one who does not work (reverse-coded)," and, "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if the mother works when the child is young."

feminist movement and pro-abortion movement has given it a different gendered image (Freeman 1993).

The politicization of issues of gender and sexuality is reflected in the emergence of differentiated framings and understandings of feminism and femininity related to either party. The Democrats, for example, have championed "women's issues" over time, including pay gaps, workplace harassment, reproductive rights, and social welfare issues (Sharrow et al. 2016). Strolovitch et al. (2017) refer to white conservative feminism as distinctly anti-feminist and a "possessive investment in heteropatriarchy" (354), which they attribute to the interlocking power hierarchies related to whiteness, religion, and gender.

Voters, importantly, also perceive these differences. Republicans are seen as 'masculine' and Democrats as 'feminine' (Winter, 2010), and employ this language in their party agendas (Roberts and Utych 2020). Ondercin (2017) finds that a highly visible change and cue for individuals has been the increasing share of Democratic representatives who are women, such that partisans may seek out the party that aligned with their (gendered) social identities and (gender) attitudes. Consistent with this, other work has shown that voters with higher levels of women's group consciousness and identification with feminism have been important predictors of supporting Democrats (Conover 1988). Recently, these beliefs about the normative roles of men and women are increasingly predictive of support for policies like healthcare (Winter, 2005), support for candidates (Sharrow et al. 2016) and voting behavior (Valentino, et al. 2018, Strolovitch et al. 2017).

Gender attitudes present a tougher case to align with the expanding literature on partisan-based attitudinal change. Gender attitudes are rooted in family socialization and individuals' lived experiences, through which 'updating' happens, and therefore more resistant to change (Davis and Greenstein, 2009, Davis, 2007, Sutfin et al., 2008). Moreover, strongest predictors of gender attitudes include education and ones' socialization background, and studies rarely addresses

associations between political identities or ideology. As a result, gender attitudes should be more resilient than political attitudes on foreign policy and immigration, and the magnitude of change is unlikely to be dramatic.

Increased elite-level polarization, including on issues related to gender, has made apparent clear and consistent ideological and positional differences between either party. This, in turn, has increased the relevance of partisan identification (vis a vis other ideological or social group attachments) to any given political situation or issue. Partisanship (and ideology) have come to be understood as the most important identity in politics in the United States today (Azari and Hetherington 2016, Bartels 2000, Campbell et al. 1960, Hetherington 2001). This has several of the following consequences on political life: individuals are more likely to take political action if they identify strongly with the party (Mason et al. 2011) and substantial work has documented the rise of negative affect towards the other party (affective polarization) (Iyengar et al. 2019).

This has sparked a debate as to whether elite level polarization has resulted in greater mass polarization in political attitudes (Hetherington 2009). Certainly, partisans are better sorted in their attitudes. But there is consistent evidence that partisanship plays some role, if small (Levendusky, 2009). Individuals are more likely to listen to co-partisans (Zaller 1992). Moreover, as voters take in increasingly clear and distinct messages, filter them through partisan-tinted 'perceptual screens' and are likely to update their political beliefs to be consistent with their party's messages (Bolsen, et al., 2014, Harteveld, et al., 2017, Levendusky 2010, 2013). Consistent with Engelhardt's hypothesis that racial attitudes are increasingly driven by partisanship over social sorting, Hypothesis 1 sets a similar expectation for gender attitudes:

Hypothesis 1: In recent years, the role of partisanship in shaping gender attitudes has grown *relative* to the role of gender attitudes in giving rise to partisan attachments.

Social and Political Identities, Polarization, and Gender Attitudes

While the importance of partisanship as a group attachment has grown and parties have become more clearly divided on gender issues, its potential to shape gender beliefs is only one part of the story. The question remains what kind of partisan is more likely to update their gender attitudes to be congruent with that of their partisan affiliation. Building off of work that explores the consequences of the remarkable changes in the social profiles of either the Democratic and Republican parties, I argue that the effect of partisanship on changes in gender attitudes is conditional on the extent to which an individuals' social group attachments align with that of their party, such that those with greater alignment of identities are more likely to update their attitudes, while those with less clear alignment experience greater cross-pressures that might moderate the effect of partisanship on attitudinal change.

Group membership in a range of social categories has long been understood to be the basis for partisan identification and attitude formation (Campbell et al. 1960). Historically, there was greater cross-pressuring of groups and their alignment with politics, which may have moderated the potential for polarization (Mason 2016). As partisanship as a group attachment and identity has become more important, it has also come into alignment with an individuals' other social and political identities (Mason 2018). As Lilliana Mason argues, "[the sorting] that has occurred during the last 50 years has not been a consequences-free realignment of static identities. Sorting, by virtue of its basis in social identities, has acted to increase the strength of political identities and has polarized mass political behavior (Mason 2015: 128)." More recently, social and political identities have become more intertwined and political conflict has been reduced to a single fault line, partisanship (Mason 2018).

Consequently, the previously non- or less political has become eminently political. The social distinctiveness of American political parties has increased over time, such that racial, religious, and

even urban/rural identities or cleavages are uniquely aligned with either partisan identity. Specifically, Republicans tend to be whiter, conservative, and religious, while Democrats trend towards being racially diverse, liberal, and secular. This alignment of social identities with partisan ones has been associated with stronger partisan attachments (Mason and Wronski 2018). The direction of this change is somewhat up for debate, as Egan (2019) finds that the strength of these partisan attachments has also been linked to causal changes in individuals' social identification, such that individuals with stronger partisan attachments are more likely to update their non-political identities to align with their political ones.

This has important implications for the study of gender role attitudes. The features of the social landscape that shape gender attitudes historically did not also predict partisanship. In recent years, the identities and group attachments – especially religious and ideological identities – that are associated with particular gender attitudes are now also associated with partisan ones. Religious identification is indicative of the socialization background that might have fostered particular gender attitudes, but is also associated with contemporary religious affiliations that sustain those attitudes in adulthood. Ideological identification as a conservative or liberal similarly is associated with more traditional or egalitarian orientations towards gender roles and gendered work-family arrangements.

What is the relationship between individuals' social group alignments with partisanship and political attitudes? I argue that the alignment of social group attachments with partisanship serves to strengthen the relationship between partisanship and gender attitudes. Partisans who are better sorted feel fewer cross-pressures on their attitudes and identities (Mason 2016). These also tend to be stronger partisans. Stronger partisans, in turn, are more attuned to politics and their parties' messages and more likely to internalize party cues (Lenz 2012). This has the potential to create a self-enforcing cycle. Partisanship, especially for those who are well sorted, could serve to 'sharpen' pre-existing beliefs. This is a matter of degree, but also type. For a multi-dimensional set of attitudes

(like gender attitudes), strongly sorted partisans are more likely to hold more consistent beliefs across different types of gender attitudes.

Adding fuel to this fire is that the parties have clarified their stances on gender issues as this sorting has taken place. As battles over gender issues have taken on a distinct partisan character, it is increasingly clear which parties are in favor of abortion access, concerns over sexual harassment and assault, diverse representation, and policies geared towards addressing gender inequalities. Because the clarity of partisan messages on issues has been linked with greater attitudinal consistency among voters (Levendusky 2009), I also expect this to be true for gender attitudes.

The expectation is then that better sorted partisans will hold more polarized and consistent gender attitudes. But it also allows me to test the relative power of partisanship compared to the role of social groups in predicting gender attitudes. If partisanship *alone* is driving attitudinal changes, then we would expect even the less well-sorted individuals to be subjected to attitudinal updating and shifts. In fact, the effect on gender attitudes would be uniform across different levels of social sorting. By contrast, if social sorting and partisanship reinforce one another, then the effect would vary across levels of sorting. Better sorted individuals in this case would be more likely to have different sets of gender attitudes because they are more likely to be stronger partisans, be attuned to party messages, and incorporate partisan messages into their own attitudes. But less sorted individuals, or those whose social groups are cross-pressured vis a vis partisanship, are less likely to have strongly polarized gender attitudes.

Hypothesis 2: Well-sorted partisans are more likely than less well-sorted partisans to hold both more distinct and internally consistent gender attitudes.

Data

The data for this paper comes from several sources. The first set of empirical analysis uses data on gender attitudes and partisanship from three nationally-representative panel surveys. The

ANES Panel was run from 1992 to 1994 (N=750). The GSS Panel is a three-wave panel study which was run from 2006, 2008, and 2010 (N = 2,000). The third set of data come from the 2016-2019 VOTER panel survey, first conducted during the presidential campaign of 2016, with subsequent waves in 2017 and 2019 (N=8,000). This is done in order to capture different moments in U.S. politics with varying importance of partisanship. The dependent variable is party identification (seven point, recoded 0-1) and gender attitudes (also scaled to 0-1). The only consistent dependent variable across surveys is the question about traditional arrangements. "Generally speaking, it is better for a man to work and better for women to tend to the home."

The second set of analyses uses only the General Social Survey Panel, which was a three-wave panel run between 2006 and 2010. I use this panel as opposed to any more recent panel because it contains a larger battery of gender attitude questions. It contains the same question about traditional roles: "Generally speaking, is it better for a man to work and a woman to tend to the home?" This question is available for 1977, 1985, and every wave since then, and is used in the analysis that produced Figure 1. But the panel also contains several other questions on gender attitudes which I use to create a scale of gender attitudes. The questions included in this scale are: "Generally speaking, it is better for a man to work and a woman to tend to the home?" "A working mother can have just as warm a relationship with her child as one who does not work (reverse-coded)," and, "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if the mother works when the child is young" (See Appendix). Partisanship is measured on a seven-point scale (Strong Democrat to Strong Republican).

Additionally, the data contain common controls for gender attitudes including: education (categorical), age, marital status, gender, region, attention to politics, religious attendance, respondent's household income, and the number of children the respondent has.

Empirical Analysis: Cross-Lagged Panel Regressions

I use cross-lagged panel regressions and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) using data from the ANES panel, GSS panel, and VOTER panel to unpack the over time change in the relationship between party identification and gender attitudes (Finkel, 1995). The goal of cross-lagged models is to understand why gender attitudes have become more polarized – because gender attitudes are leading to later partisan identification, or if partisan identification predicts later gender attitudes. I follow Engelhardt's (2020) approach using several panels to assess the relationship at different points in time when both gender issues were more (less) salient to partisan politics, and partisanship was more or less central to political life. These capture three different moments in the relevance of gender issues to American politics and move from a less partisan centric world of the 1990s to the "hyper-polarized" world of the late 2010s.

The cross-lagged models are estimated simultaneously and can be shown mathematically as:

$$gender\ attitudes_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 gender\ attitudes_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$PID_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 gender\ attitudes_{i,t-1} + \nu_i \quad (2)$$

The first model regresses gender attitudes for individual *i* at time *t* against their reported partisanship at *t-1* while controlling for the respondents' previously reported gender attitudes. The second model regresses current partisanship for individual *i* at time *t* against their lagged gender attitudes at time *t-1* while controlling for lagged partisanship.

This method allows me to examine how much change in one variable (i.e. gender attitudes) can be attributed to lagged values of gender attitudes and partisan identification, and conversely how much change in partisanship is accounted for by lagged values of both gender attitudes and partisan identification. In these equations, β_1 and α_2 reflect the extent to which lagged partisanship and gender attitudes, respectively predict later values of the *other* construct. β_2 and α_1 account for the stability of each other construct over time, and are lagged values of the dependent variable.

There are two things that can be assessed with this model. First, the (lack of) significance of the outcomes of interest, β_1 and α_2, suggest whether or not partisanship predicts gender attitudes (β_1) or whether gender attitudes predict partisanship (α_2). Second, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) allows coefficients to be compared across the two models, which can shed light on the *relative* explanatory power of partisanship or sorting (gender attitudes). Therefore, third and sixth columns in each set of models compares the effects of β_1 (partisanship $_{t-1}$) and α_2 (gender attitudes$_{t-1}$). A statistically significant difference in coefficients suggests different relative magnitudes of either explanatory pathway. If $\beta_1 > \alpha_2$, then this suggests partisanship matters more for gender attitude formation. But if the opposite is true, and $\alpha_2 < \beta_1$, then gender attitudes, sorting, and socialization are stronger drivers of partisan identification.

Table 3.1: Relationship between Gender Attitudes and Partisanship, ANES Panel 1992-1994

	All Respondents			White Americans		
	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2
PID $_{t-1}$	0.008	0.858*	-0.036	0.011	0.861*	-0.0696
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.0487)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.048)
Trad Roles $_{t-1}$	0.527*	0.054^		0.556*	-0.058^	
	(0.043)	(0.032)		(0.044)	(0.034)	
Constant	0.124	0.070		.131	0.787	
	(0.019)	(0.015)		(0.022)	(0.017)	
R^2	0.269	0.644		0.293	0.67	
Residual Std. Error	0.239	0.212		0.233	0.2	
Observations	687	687		580	580	

Note: Data from ANES Panel 1992-1994. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust standard errors.

Table 1 shows that in the ANES Panel, lagged partisanship was a statistically insignificant predictor of gender role attitudes for both a full sample and white Americans. The effect of lagged gender attitudes on partisanship is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, weakly suggesting gender

attitudes influences later partisan identification. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 1 calculate the differences between β_1 and α_2, comparing the relative strengths of either causal pathway. The differences are not significant here, suggesting that in a less partisan-centric world, there is little evidence of a relationship between gender attitudes and partisan identification.

Table 3.2: Relationship between Gender Attitudes and Partisanship, GSS Panel 2006-2010

	White Americans			All Respondents		
	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	$\beta 1$-$\alpha 2$	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	$\beta 1$-$\alpha 2$
PID $_{t-1}$	-0.0715*	0.760*	0.015	-0.066*	0.782*	-0.023
	(-0.033)	(-0.030)	(-0.05)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.042)
Trad Roles $_{t-1}$	0.529*	-0.086*		0.482*	-0.043	
	(-0.038)	(-0.039)		(0.033)	(0.031)	
Constant	0.327*	0.174*		0.343*	0.108*	
	(-0.034)	(-0.035)		(0.028)	(0.025)	
R^2	0.33	0.62		0.273	0.61	
Residual Std. Error	0.227	0.204		0.237	0.212	
Observations	565	565		782	782	

Note: Data from GSS Panel survey 2006-2010. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust standard errors.

Table 2 shows the GSS Panel nearly a decade and a half later as the process of elite polarization has taken place and partisanship has become more relevant to political life. For the first time, an individual's previously reported partisan identification is statistically significantly related to an an individual's later gender attitudes. The difference between the strongest partisans amounts to about a third of a category change in the gender attitudes question, which is substantively rather small. For white respondents, the effect of sorting is also present; previously reported gender attitudes predict later partisan identification. the results look slightly different for all respondents, where the effect of sorting washes out.

The results in columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 calculate the difference between β_1 and α_2, which intended to compare the relative strengths of either causal pathway. If β_1 was greater than α_2, this would suggest that lagged partisanship has a greater effect on current gender attitudes as compared to the effect of lagged gender attitudes on current partisanship. However, these differences are not significant. For these data from the 2000s, it does not appear that either pathway holds greater explanatory power, yet both are present.

Table 3.3: Relationship between Gender Attitudes and Partisanship, VOTER 2016-2019 Data

	White Americans			All Respondents		
	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2
PID $_{t-1}$	-0.115*	0.946*	-0.073*	-0.125*	0.946*	-0.105*
	(-0.02)	(-0.013)	-0.023	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.02)
Trad Roles $_{t-1}$	0.663*	-0.042*		0.657*	-0.019^	
	(-0.031)	(-0.011)		(0.023)	(0.010)	
Constant	0.307*	0.068*		0.313	0.047	
	(-0.02)	(-0.011)		(0.025)	(0.009)	
R^2	0.49	0.89		0.49	0.88	
Residual Std. Error	0.223	0.127		0.221	0.122	
Observations	4,634	4,634		5,756	5,756	

Note: Data from VOTER survey 2016-2019. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust standard errors.

Table 3 displays the results from the same seemingly unrelated regression models for the VOTER panel survey that was conducted between 2016 and 2019, when gender issues were more salient, particularly because of the Trump candidacy and #MeToo movement. Importantly, it is a snapshot of a time characterized by strong elite polarization and primacy of partisanship. In these data, the effect of β_1 (partisanship$_{t-1}$) on the traditional roles questions is substantively and statistically significant, and stronger than in the previous models. Strong partisans, 40% of the sample, separate by 0.129 on the gender attitude question, or about a half a category. A similar

pattern unfolds for the effect of lagged gender attitudes on partisanship, such that there is an effect of sorting for white Americans that fails to pan out for the full sample that includes non-white Americans.

The takeaway from these models, though, is that the difference in the effect size, calculated in columns three and six, is significant in the expected direction. The overall effect of lagged partisanship driving later gender attitudes is greater than the other way around, such that in this era of hyper-polarization, it seems that gender attitudes are more strongly driven by partisan identification than the effect of individuals sorting into either party on the basis of their gender beliefs.

The Role of Sorting and Partisanship on Gender Attitude Consistency

In the previous section, the results from the cross-lagged models indicate that partisanship has become a more prominent predictor of gender attitudes. But an open question remains *which* partisans are more likely to adopt these gender attitudes. Bringing together work on the social sorting of the American electorate and partisan-biased attitudinal change, I theorized that well-sorted partisans were more likely than those whose social group attachments are less aligned with their party's modal groups to express both more consistent and polarized gender attitudes. Research on social sorting has found that partisanship is increasingly associated with a set of social characteristics and parties are internally more coherent, and that this alignment of social groupings facilitates stronger partisan attachments. But what makes gender attitudes unique vis a vis other political attitudes is that those social characteristics that are associated with partisanship are in alignment with the social characteristics that promote different sets of gender role attitudes. If that alignment of attitudes facilitates partisan attachments, this might carry important consequences for attitudes, as another line of work has demonstrated that stronger partisans are more likely to adopt parties' messages (Lenz, 2012, Zaller and Feldman, 1992).

This section tests if individuals who are better 'sorted' (i.e. their demographics match those who 'belong' to the party) might be particularly more likely to express more consistent and polarized attitudes. If partisanship is doing most of the work, we would expect to see that all partisans, regardless of social characteristics, express more consistent and distinct gender attitudes from those of the other party. But if the cross-pressuring of social characteristics moderates the relationship to attitudinal change, then only the better-sorted partisans will hold both more internally consistent and polarized attitudes.

As a first test of this, I use latent class modeling to examine whether better sorted partisans are more likely to express more internally consistent gender attitudes. Latent class analysis is particularly useful in the case of gender attitudes, which consist of individuals' heterogeneous views about the roles of men and women in society, tradeoffs regarding career and family, and essentialist beliefs about who men and women 'are' and what they 'want.' While individuals sometimes hold different views across these dimensions, better-sorted partisans may express views more consistent across sub-dimensions. Latent class analysis searches for response patterns across (related) variables, and divides the data into probabilistic clusters where respondents in the same cluster are assumed to share some underlying association (Clogg, 1995, Collins and Lazna, 2010, Scarborough, et al. 2019). Once the clusters of attitudes are determined, they are regressed on a series of social characteristics to understand the predictors of class membership.

I follow Scarborough et al.'s (2019) approach to latent class modelling of gender attitudes in the GSS panel from 2006 to 2010. The analysis was done with the questions in Table 3.12 in the appendix that tap into essentialist beliefs, beliefs about working mothers, questions about women in the public sphere, and a rare question about men's behavior. These are consistent with how other work has categorized gender attitudes and used them in latent class analysis (Ciabattari, 2001, Donnelly, Twenge, and Clark, 2015, Knight and Brinton, 2018, Scarborough et al, 2019). The best

fitting LCA model was selected primarily on lowest BIC values, but also log likelihood, separation of the classes, in addition to theory and substantive meaning (Collins and Lanza, 2010).

The best fitting LCA was a model with five 'classes,' or ways in which individuals combined responses to a variety of gender attitude questions. They are: Strong Egalitarians (17%), Egalitarians (37%), Ambivalents (15%), Traditionalists (24%), and Strong Traditionalists (7%). Strong Egalitarians express the most consistent set of egalitarian beliefs across all dimensions, while strong traditionalists do the same for traditional attitudes. Egalitarians and Traditionalists are differentiated from Strong Egalitarians/Traditionalists in that they either hold more mixed attitudes across sub-dimensions and slightly less egalitarian/traditional beliefs. Individuals who responded in the most heterogenous ways were grouped into the 'Ambivalents' category. Table 3.12 in the appendix shows conditional response probabilities for all questions.

The next step is to analyze class membership. I use multinomial logits to identify associations between class membership (the five categories listed above) and socio-structural and political characteristics, with standard errors clustered at the person level for the full GSS panel sample (2006-2010). Following the Mason and Wronski (2018), I create a measure to assess the degree to which individuals match their parties' social and ideological profile. White, religious individuals, and self-identified conservatives are put into a scale ranging from 0-1, where one indicates perfectly sorted individuals and zero indicates the least well-sorted Republicans. Minorities, secular individuals, and liberals are used to create a similar variable for 'objective Democrats.' In general, Republicans are better sorted than their Democratic counterparts, which is not surprising given that the Democrats can be seen as a party of multiple (racial and ethnic) coalitions, while the Republican party is more homogenous (Mason 2018).

The results (Appendix Tables 3.13-3.15) indicate that better levels of sorting are associated with belonging to one of the more 'extreme' classes of Strong Egalitarians or Traditionalists, relative

to the likelihood of belonging to the middling "Ambivalent" group. Being a better-sorted Republican is associated with an increased probability of holding more consistently traditional gender beliefs; they are more likely than those who hold ambivalent beliefs to be traditionalists and strong traditionalists. Moreover, greater levels sorting (at the individual level) is associated with a lower probability of holding egalitarian attitudes. The same is true for white, but not all, Democrats; well-sorted white Democrats are more likely to hold egalitarian or strong egalitarian gender attitudes, and significantly less likely to hold very traditional beliefs (reference category: Ambivalent attitudes).

Lastly, I test the proposition that the degree of social alignment with the party and partisanship combined lead to more polarized sets of gender attitudes. To test this, I return to leveraging the panel structure of the data to see if the effect of partisanship on gender attitudes is conditional on the extent to which individuals' social characteristics are in alignment with that of their party. I use fixed effects OLS regression models regressing the gender attitude scale on the interaction of partisanship (Democrat or Republican binary) and the social alignment variable, with controls for religious attendance, income, and number of children (see Appendix Table 3.17-3.18). I also run an alternative specification that interacts a 7-point partisanship scale with the social alignment variable.

In both cases, the interaction of partisanship and social sorting is significant. Better sorted partisans, conditional on party identification, are likely to have more polarized gender attitudes. The best sorted Republicans (Democrats) have more traditional (egalitarian) gender attitudes than the least-sorted Republicans (Democrats). Figure 1 shows the predicted values of gender attitudes that emerge from the model interacting the level of within-party sorting across different partisan attachments.

Figure 3.2: Marginal Effects Plot, Sorting on Gender Attitudes



Note: The plot shows the predicted values of the gender attitudes scale for Republicans and Democrats at different levels of the measure of social sorting. The regression model, including controls for income, work status, number of children, political awareness, age, and panel identifiers can be found in the Appendix Table 3.16, Model 1.

At the lowest levels of social alignment to partisanship, the difference between Democrats' and Republicans' gender attitudes is not statistically significant. But at higher levels of sorting, these differences become statistically significant. The difference is equivalent to slightly more than a standard deviation difference in the gender attitudes scale.

One possibility is that less sorted individuals belong to a variety of social groups that result in more heterogeneous gender attitudes. Another possibility is that the extent of social sorting is merely a proxy for the strength of partisan attachments, such that weaker identifiers, those who are least likely to receive and internalize their party's messages on gender issues, are simultaneously those who belong to social groups with competing partisan affiliations. To test whether the effects hold at particular levels of sorting or asymmetrically across the strength of partisan identification, I run an alternative model with a 7-point partisanship scale. The results suggest that the marginal effects of partisan-aligned identities are statistically significant across nearly every level of partisan identification. Worth noting is that within each category, the effects of sorting are statistically

insignificant at low levels of sorting (<0.5), and only statistically significant for those with higher congruence of identities and partisanship. This suggests that even a distant connection to the party, when combined with partisan-aligned social groupings, can strengthen the association between party and attitude.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article addresses the recognition among scholars of gender attitudes that the path towards egalitarian attitudes is not as straightforward as it once seemed. Many scholars have identified either reversals in gender egalitarianism, but recently much attention has shifted to understanding the heterogeneous beliefs individuals hold (Grunow, et al., 2017, Knight and Brinton, 2018, Pepin and Cotter, 2018). In particular, Dernberger and Pepin (2020) find significant support for more traditional arrangements among young men and women, while Shorrocks (2018) finds significant support for more gender essentialist beliefs among younger generations. Part of what might be underlying these changing patterns of gender attitudes is how social characteristics and party alignment have come to reinforce one another, especially in contexts where issues around gender are made politically salient.

Over the last half-century, parties have taken clearer stances on gender issues while at the same time their electoral bases have become more socially distinct. I first demonstrated that partisans have become polarized on their gender attitudes. While traditional attitudes were more common in the 1980s, party did not separate gender egalitarians from gender traditionalists. While neither party is expressing *more* conservative attitudes than previously, their gender attitudes have drifted apart. But what is the driver of the relationship between gender attitudes and partisanship? Party polarization on gender issues could be related to gender attitudes because individuals internalize and then espouse their parties' gender attitudes. On the other hand, it could instead

reflect the fact that certain social groups that promote different gender attitudes have better sorted themselves into opposing parties.

The results from the cross-lagged models first suggest that the effect size of both partisanship on gender attitudes increases over the course of two decades of panel data. Partisans update their gender attitudes, particularly in recent years, where the effect of partisanship on attitudes eclipses the effect of gender attitudes on partisan identification.

However, scholarship should be cautious of making claims that greater identification with a party singularly leads individuals to align their attitudes with those of the party. This is especially true of gender attitudes, which are thought to be formed as a result of personal experiences and socialization. Those socialization factors as they relate to gender attitudes are today in alignment with the same factors promoting partisan attachments because of the social sorting that has occurred. Bridging theories of partisan induced attitudinal changes with theories of social sorting suggests that if partisans hold socially aligned characteristics with that of their party, they are more likely to adopt attitudes consistent with that party and hold more consistent and polarized beliefs, as results from the latent class analysis and panel analysis show.

The implication of this work is that the process of social change and its alignment with party politics has had important consequences for ostensibly non-political attitudes. Partisanship, especially when combined with strong social ties to a particular party, has the potential to result in more polarized gender attitudes. Because of the relationship between partisanship and social identities, this has the potential to be a self-enforcing cycle (Egan 2020). Part of the question of what is happening to gender attitudes in the United States, then, also has to do with partisanship, net of all other factors.

One particular question that arose during the 2016 election cycle is why white women broke in favor of Trump, seeming to defy expectations about how his overtly sexist remarks would be

received by them. This comports with and expands on recent work showing conservative and liberal women have fundamentally different understandings of womanhood that align with their partisan identities (McCall and Orloff, 2017). Social divides and partisanship reinforce each other, demonstrating polarization is reaching into spheres of American society previously understood as apolitical.

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APPENDIX

Figure A1: Theoretical Model



Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics, GSS Data 1977-2018

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Traditional Roles	30075	0.57136	0.2282628	0	1
Gender Attitude Scale	24368	0	1	-2.50956	1.8683
Women's Share Inc.	26919	0.303841	0.3211483	0	1
Household Type	38020	3.78485	2.08924	1	7
Sex	53695	1.572083	0.4947814	1	2
Year	53695	1994.498	13.42971	1972	2018
Age	53502	42.54276	14.7375	18	89

Democrat	32390	0.5919111	0.4914873	0	1
Party ID	52469	0.444798	0.330987	0	1
HH Incom	53695	30436.51	30021.58	0	162607
Religious Attend	53213	3.718246	2.699907	0	8
Education	53565	1.400989	1.171996	0	4
Mother's Education	47346	0.8876146	0.9949603	0	4
Region	53695	4.3632	2.580737	0	9
Race	53695	1.262967	0.5587426	1	3
Children	53695	0.7280939	0.4449459	0	1
Marital Status	53674	2.314957	1.644367	1	5
Subjective Class	50782	2.427671	0.6496494	1	4

Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics, ANES Panel Survey 1992-1994

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Traditional Roles	1413	0.208	0.280	0	1
Party ID	1467	0.513	0.338	0	1

Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics, GSS Panel Survey 2006-2010

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Party ID	4694	0.457	0.334	0	1
Traditional Roles	3118	0.585	0.282	0	1
Gender Attitude Scale	3152	0.585	0.099	0	1
Objective Sorting	4667	0.554	0.262	0	1

Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics, VOTER Panel Survey 2016-2019

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Traditional Roles	14603	0.7844	0.289	0	1
Party ID	14677	0.4636	0.369	0	1
News Interest	14640	0.1605	0.258	0	1

Figure 3.4: Correlation Between Traditional Roles Question and PID in GSS Data



Note: GSS Data 1977, 1985-2018

Figure 3.5: Correlation Between Gender Attitudes Scale and PID in GSS Data



Note: GSS Data 1977, 1985-2018

The gender attitude scales were constructed through principal component factor analysis, using varmax rotation for the gender attitude scale. The goal of creating scales is to improve scale reliability and leverage greater variation in different question responses. The gender attitude scale in

the GSS Panel is constructed with three questions that provide the greatest coverage in terms of years available: 1977, 1985, and every GSS wave thereafter. They are, "Generally speaking, it is better if the man works and a woman tends to the home," "A preschool child is likely to suffer if the mother works," and, "A working mother can have as warm a relationship with her child, as one who does not work." The following is the output from the scale construction model:

Table 3.8: Gender Attitude Scale Construction, GSS All Waves (1977, 1985-2018)

Variables	Values
Working Mother Doesn't Hurt	-0.800
Preschool child	0.841
Traditional Roles	0.788

Note: Eigenvalue for first factor is 1.96; no other factor meets the conventional standard of > 1.

Table 3.9: Alpha by Wave of Survey, Gender Attitude Scale

Year	Alpha
1977	0.751
1985	0.744
1994	0.753
2006	0.715
2018	0.664

Table 3.10: Gender Attitude Scale Construction, GSS Panel, 2006-2010

Variables	Values
Working Mother Doesn't Hurt	-0.818
Preschool child	0.850
Traditional Roles	0.796

Note: Eigenvalue for first factor is 2.02; no other factor meets the conventional standard of > 1.

The tradeoff of using a scale like this is that it assumes the scale is one-dimensional. The questions "Working Mother" and "Preschool child" are often grouped together as questions about the consequences of mothers in the workforce, taken for granted they are in the workforce (Ciabattari, 2001). The traditional roles question belongs to a category of its own, as it asks about traditional and essentialist visions of gendered roles and spheres (Davis and Greenstein, 2009, Donnelly, Twenge, and Clark, 2015). Responses to these questions have elsewhere been shown to diverge (Grunow et al., 2017, Knight and Brinton, 2018, Scarborough et al., 2016). I address the issue of multi-dimensionality in much greater depth in the latent class analysis.

The following plots show the distribution of the dependent variables by survey and year. The first set of plots are for the only question with continuous measures in the panel data – a question about traditional roles for women in society. The second set of plots are for a gender attitude scale and a sexism scale, constructed from three questions, (Preschool child, working mothers, and including the traditional role question). See Table 3.8 for scale construction.

Figure 3.6: Traditional Roles Question, ANES Panel, 1992



Figure 3.7: Traditional Roles Question, GSS Panel, 2006



Figure 3.8: Distribution of Gender Attitude Scale Among Party Identifiers, GSS Panel, 2008



Figure 3.9: Traditional Roles Question, VOTER Study, 2016



Table 3.9: Alternative Specification for GSS Panel, All Respondents

Alternative Specifications with All Respondents, 2006-2010						
	Gender Attitude Scale			Traditional Roles		
	Gender Att $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2
PID $_{t-1}$	-0.0439*	0.782*	0.0627	-0.0656*	0.782*	-0.023
	(0.0142)	(0.0236)	(0.0932)	(0.0291)	(0.0243)	(0.0416)
Gender Att $_{t-1}$	0.673*	-0.107				
	(0.0549)	(0.0925)				
Trad Roles $_{t-1}$				0.482*	-0.0426	
				(0.0325)	(0.0312)	
Constant	0.252	0.144		0.343	0.108	
	(0.0345)	(0.0587)		(0.0277)	(0.0252)	
R^2	0.27	0.613		0.273	0.61	
Residual Std. Error	0.115	0.21		0.237	0.212	
Observations	803	803		782	782	

Note: Data from GSS panel 2006-2010. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust standard errors.

Description of Table 3.9: The table replicates the cross-lagged regression results for all respondents (as compared to only white respondents) with data from the GSS panel from 2006 to 2010. The results demonstrate that lagged partisanship plays a relatively weak role in shaping future gender attitudes in both specifications (Columns 1 & 4). The results for social sorting are not statistically significant; lagged gender attitudes do not predict partisanship in later waves. This suggests

that the addition of non-white and Latinx individuals causes this to be statistically insignificant, attesting to the idea that at least at this time, social sorting mechanisms might work differently for non-white and Latinx Americans. Note also that the model fit statistics are considerably lower than in the paper. This is a strong case to better theorize and consider how race/ethnicity alters the dynamics often assumed to be at play for white Americans.

Table 3.10: Alternative Specifications for VOTER Panel

	2016-2018 Comparison			2018-2019 Comparison		
	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2
PID $_{t-1}$	-.131*	0.938*	-0.10*	-0.118*	0.993*	-0.109*
	(0.02)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.025)
Trad Roles $_{t-1}$	0.667*	-0.031*		0.069*	-0.009	
	(0.024)	(0.013)		(0.0283)	(0.007)	
Constant	0.31	0.061		0.276	0.016	
	(0.026)	(0.013)		(0.033)	(0.008)	
R^2	0.53	0.92		0.54	0.94	
Residual Std. Error	0.209	0.102		0.212	0.085	
Observations	2,902	2,902		2,905	2,905	

Note: Data from VOTER survey 2016-2019. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust standard errors.

Table 3.11: VOTER Panel by Political Interest, White Americans

White Americans by Political Interest						
	High Political Interest			Low Political Interest		
	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2	Trad Roles $_t$	PID $_t$	β_1-α_2
PID $_{t-1}$	-.129*	0.957*	-0.087*	-0.095*	0.923*	-0.049
	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.050)
Trad Roles $_{t-1}$	0.660*	-0.041*		0.657*	-0.047*	
	(0.032)	(0.011)		(0.049)	(0.021)	
Constant	0.323	0.067		0.287	0.073	
	(0.033)	(0.012)		(0.056)	(0.022)	
R^2	0.53	0.91		0.45	0.85	
Residual Std. Error	0.209	0.115		0.243	0.144	
Observations	3,170	3,170		1,464	1,464	

Note: Data from VOTER survey 2016-2019. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust standard errors.

Table 3.12: Conditional Response Probabilities for LCA Model

Response Probabilities

It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Egalitarians	0.0041	0.1875	**0.6837**	0.1247
Ambivalents	0	0	**0.8446**	0.1554
Strong Egal.	0.0232	0.0383	0.2291	**0.7094**
Most Trad.	**0.4798**	0.283	0.1662	0.071
Trad.	0.1154	**0.6838**	0.2008	0

A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Egalitarians	0	0.0044	**0.9634**	0.0321
Ambivalents	0.0395	**0.4696**	**0.4909**	0
Strong Egal.	0.0091	0.0539	0.3164	**0.6206**
Most Trad.	**0.65**	0.2505	0.0742	0.0254
Trad.	0.0261	**0.7105**	0.2588	0.0046

A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Egalitarians	0.0072	0.0174	**0.7594**	0.2159
Ambivalents	0.0021	**0.457**	**0.4665**	0.0744
Strong Egal.	0.0113	0.0096	0.1254	**0.8537**
Most Trad.	**0.4594**	0.3145	0.115	0.1111
Trad.	0.0385	**0.5693**	0.3279	0.0642

Men Hurt Their Families When They Focus on Work Too Much

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither/Nor	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Egalitarians	0.0407	**0.4017**	0.1798	0.374	0.0039
Ambivalents	0.0627	**0.628**	0.095	0.202	0.0123
Strong Egal.	0.0984	**0.3439**	0.159	**0.2834**	0.1152
Most Trad.	**0.3177**	**0.4425**	0.0729	0.1256	0.0413
Trad.	0.1034	**0.5813**	0.0994	0.2151	0.0008

Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women.

	Agree	Disagree
Egalitarians	0.1855	**0.8145**

Ambivalents	0.0936	**0.9064**
Strong Egal.	0.0845	**0.9155**
Most Trad.	0.3692	**0.6308**
Trad.	**0.4447**	**0.5553**

Figure 3.10: Model Fit Statistics for LCA



Table 3.13: Predicting Class Membership Using Objective Sorting, All Respondents

All Respondents

VARIABLES	(1) Most Egal	(2) Egal	(3) Ambiv	(4) Trad	(5) Most Trad
Objective Democrat (0-1)	1.016	0.364		-0.154	-1.994
	(0.665)	(0.576)		(0.671)	(1.278)
Party Identification	-0.356***	-0.107		-0.0465	0.0255
	(0.0986)	(0.0840)		(0.0919)	(0.159)
Sex	0.963***	0.423**		-0.0674	0.674**
	(0.238)	(0.198)		(0.216)	(0.342)
Religious Attendance	0.0209	-0.0170		0.0730*	0.0351
	(0.0448)	(0.0386)		(0.0419)	(0.0710)
Education	0.329***	0.177**		-0.190*	-0.386*
	(0.107)	(0.0894)		(0.107)	(0.228)
Mother Degree	-0.0559	-0.0948		0.00877	-0.562**
	(0.123)	(0.0957)		(0.104)	(0.226)
Working (0/1)	0.212	0.231		-0.270	0.0763
	(0.234)	(0.198)		(0.225)	(0.330)

Income (0-1)	-0.0903	-0.0817		-0.358***	-0.0928
	(0.118)	(0.0993)		(0.135)	(0.230)
Age	0.00119	-0.00474		-0.0139*	0.00449
	(0.00891)	(0.00726)		(0.00800)	(0.0138)
Children	0.0937	0.0672		0.0476	0.174
	(0.0856)	(0.0709)		(0.0759)	(0.115)
Widowed (ref: married)	-0.00949	0.0298		-0.0422	-0.0429
	(0.524)	(0.446)		(0.481)	(0.782)
Divorced (ref: married)	0.682**	0.617**		0.208	0.693
	(0.312)	(0.280)		(0.302)	(0.487)
Separated (ref: married)	-0.445	0.128		-0.833*	0.209
	(0.538)	(0.430)		(0.488)	(0.557)
Single (ref: married)	0.532	0.441		-0.0932	0.646
	(0.323)	(0.269)		(0.291)	(0.513)
Reginal Indicators	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Constant	-7.781	-9.014		24.11**	2.572
	(11.19)	(11.63)		(10.45)	(17.30)
Observations	2,310	2,310	2,310	2,310	2,310

Standard errors clustered at person level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.14: Predicting Class Membership Using Objective Sorting, White Respondents

VARIABLES	(6) Most Egal	(7) Egal	(8) Ambiv	(9) Trad	(10) Most Trad
Objective Democrat (0-1)	2.022***	1.378***		0.312	-2.255*
	(0.638)	(0.524)		(0.638)	(1.366)
Party Identification	-0.0759	-0.0238		0.115**	0.213***
	(0.0542)	(0.0428)		(0.0464)	(0.0753)
Sex	1.610***	0.626***		0.289	0.215
	(0.222)	(0.175)		(0.190)	(0.276)
Religious Attendance	0.0946**	0.0518		0.163***	0.180***
	(0.0429)	(0.0350)		(0.0367)	(0.0546)
Education	0.181*	-0.000297		-0.244***	-0.155
	(0.0980)	(0.0766)		(0.0827)	(0.144)
Mother Degree	0.00718	-0.0977		0.0362	-0.337**
	(0.107)	(0.0805)		(0.0832)	(0.158)
Working (0/1)	0.398*	0.266		-0.0735	0.0805
	(0.219)	(0.183)		(0.194)	(0.304)
Income (0-1)	0.111	-0.00488		-0.281***	-0.338*
	(0.0953)	(0.0827)		(0.101)	(0.197)
Age	-0.00342	-0.00540		-0.0161**	-0.00553

	(0.00851)	(0.00680)		(0.00729)	(0.0119)
Children	0.0409	0.00125		0.0380	0.174*
	(0.0789)	(0.0671)		(0.0655)	(0.0984)
Widowed (ref: married)	0.0786	0.0285		-0.220	-0.417
	(0.517)	(0.418)		(0.435)	(0.624)
Divorced (ref: married)	0.905***	0.404		0.0633	0.230
	(0.295)	(0.260)		(0.274)	(0.409)
Separated (ref: married)	0.551	0.267		-0.331	0.710
	(0.573)	(0.542)		(0.584)	(0.672)
Single (ref: married)	0.365	-0.0560		-0.243	0.156
	(0.314)	(0.257)		(0.277)	(0.490)
Reginal Indicators	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Constant	1.390	8.702		31.50**	9.544
	(16.58)	(13.27)		(14.20)	(23.31)
Observations	1,805	1,805	1,805	1,805	1,805

Standard errors clustered at person level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.15: Predicting Class Membership Using Objective Sorting, All Respondents Republicans

VARIABLES	(1) Most Egal	(2) Egal	(3) Ambiv	(4) Trad	(5) Most Trad
Objective Republican (0-1)	-0.842**	-0.189		0.263	1.204**
	(0.392)	(0.361)		(0.375)	(0.561)
Party Identification	-0.0560	-0.00805		0.108***	0.178***
	(0.0479)	(0.0387)		(0.0409)	(0.0591)
Sex	1.405***	0.571***		0.180	0.189
	(0.195)	(0.155)		(0.168)	(0.232)
Religious Attendance	0.0384	0.00686		0.114***	0.164***
	(0.0352)	(0.0288)		(0.0308)	(0.0466)
Education	0.188**	0.0342		-0.208***	-0.216*
	(0.0857)	(0.0687)		(0.0740)	(0.126)
Mother Degree	0.0290	-0.0688		0.0350	-0.335**
	(0.0945)	(0.0730)		(0.0755)	(0.139)
Working (0/1)	0.255	0.139		-0.196	0.0141
	(0.192)	(0.163)		(0.175)	(0.247)
Income (0-1)	0.0152	-0.00709		-0.330***	-0.233
	(0.0895)	(0.0749)		(0.0926)	(0.159)
Age	-0.00340	-0.00466		-0.0163**	-0.00628
	(0.00723)	(0.00594)		(0.00639)	(0.00945)
Children	0.0204	-0.00657		0.00589	0.149*
	(0.0678)	(0.0575)		(0.0571)	(0.0799)
Widowed (ref: married)	-0.0222	0.122		-0.0780	-0.485
	(0.464)	(0.389)		(0.401)	(0.580)

Divorced (ref: married)	0.687***	0.486**		0.0159	0.257
	(0.261)	(0.229)		(0.247)	(0.353)
Separated (ref: married)	-0.427	-0.0124		-0.960**	-0.114
	(0.494)	(0.380)		(0.435)	(0.498)
Single (ref: married)	0.340	0.121		-0.256	0.391
	(0.274)	(0.226)		(0.240)	(0.365)
Reginal Indicators	_	_		_	_
Constant	3.331	8.135		32.33***	10.33
	(14.19)	(11.64)		(12.51)	(18.52)
Observations	2,310	2,310	2,310	2,310	2,310

Standard errors clustered at person level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.16: Panel Regressions Predicting Gender Attitudes Using Sorting Measures, All Respondents

VARIABLES	(1) Gender Attitudes Scale	(2) Egalitarian Class	(3) Traditional Class
Party Identity	-0.561**	-2.700**	3.219**
	(-0.237)	(1.282)	(1.461)
Objective Sorting	-0.552**	-2.694**	1.860
	(-0.269)	(1.336)	(1.404)
Party Identity * Objective Sorting	1.624***	5.517**	-6.779**
	(-0.501)	(2.697)	(3.422)
Fundamentalist Christian	-0.0247	0.214	0.0572
	(-0.0578)	(0.263)	(0.289)
Reads Newspaper	-0.0337	-0.172	0.185
	(-0.0238)	(0.114)	(0.117)
Age	0.0277*	0.218	-0.271
	(-0.0161)	(0.199)	(0.349)
Income (0-1)	-0.00166	-0.156	-0.292
	(-0.0368)	(0.194)	(0.297)
Children	0.0251	0.202	-0.130
	(-0.0457)	(0.230)	(0.213)
Work Status	-0.0565	0.273	-0.249
	(-0.071)	(0.326)	(0.365)
Panel Indicators	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.886	-	-
	-0.798	-	-
Observations	1,542	470	390
Number of idnum	770	175	146
R-squared	0.023	-	-

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models 2 and 3 are logistic models; because the coefficients are reported as odds ratios, interpretation from these models is only sign and significance.

Table 3.17: Sorting Measure in Interaction with Partisan Strength

	Gender Attitudes Scale
Party ID (Baseline: Strong Dem)	
Not Strong Dem	0.013
	(0.220)
Independent, Near Dem	-0.167
	(0.168)
Independent, Near Rep	0.625**
	(0.304)
Not Strong Rep	0.321
	(0.309)
Strong Rep	0.575**
	(0.347)
Party-Identity Alignment	0.848*
	(0.484)
Party ID x Identity Alignment	
Not Strong Dem	0.088
	(0.552)
Independent, Near Dem	0.117
	(0.623)
Independent	-1.471**
	(0.639)
Independent, Near Rep	-1.589**
	(0.614)
Not Strong Rep	-1.133*
	(0.604)
Strong Rep	-1.281**
	(0.622)
Religious Attendance	0.003
	(0.149)
Fundamentalist Christian	-0.012
	(0.052)
Age	0.023

	(0.016)
Income (Standardized)	0.029
	(0.038)
Children	0.000
	(0.043)
Employed	0.0335716
	(0.033)
Panel Indicators	Yes
Constant	-1.315
Obs	1846
Number ID	910
R-sq	0.027

Table 3.18: Marginal Effects of Sorting on Partisan Strength

Marginal Effects of Sorting by Party Identification		
Party Identification	Dy/Dx	p-value
Strong Democrat	1.053235	0.03
Not Strong Democrat	1.035329	0.034
Lean Democrat	1.000479	0.058
Lean Republican	-0.8191373	0.018
Not Strong Republican	-0.4285127	0.187
Strong Republican	-0.5987793	0.097